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The Rohingya ethnic group of Myanmar’s Rakhine State have 
suffered systemic discrimination and violence for several decades. An 
overwhelming majority of Rohingya had to either flee their homes, or 
stay and suffer from deplorable conditions. While a majority of states 
have condemned the atrocities perpetrated on the Rohingya, decisive 
action or even unequivocal condemnation in the U.N. General 
Assembly has been stymied by various political and strategic factors. 
The Gambia, a small African state, has taken upon itself to test the legal 
responsibility of Myanmar for atrocities on the Rohingya by filing a 
case at the International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.” or “the Court”) in 
November 2019. This Article seeks to explore how the case may play 
out as it proceeds in the I.C.J. and what it may or may not mean for the 
Rohingya by analyzing the Court’s provisional order, its record of 
hearings, and its jurisprudence along with other international courts. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Rohingya community of Myanmar’s Rakhine province is one 
of the most persecuted communities the world has seen in the last 
several decades. The international community of states and non-state 
actors have, from time to time, voiced their concerns about the systemic 
deprivation of rights, discriminatory treatment, and violence 
perpetrated on the Rohingya. However, any concerted action has been 
stymied by the strategic interests of some powerful states condoning the 
activities of Myanmar authorities. Indeed, it may be somewhat puzzling 
that the international community condemns the undemocratic rule in 
Myanmar but fails to recognize the Rohingya’s systemic tribulations. 
Even a state like Bangladesh, which has been quite severely affected by 
the influx of Rohingya taking refuge in its territories has not set in 
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motion any international legal avenue to legally impugn Myanmar’s 
activities. 
The Republic of The Gambia (“Gambia”), a state located more than 
11,500 kilometers away from Myanmar,1 have balked at the trend of 
inaction by filing a case against Myanmar on November 11, 2019. 
Gambia accused Myanmar of violating the 1948 Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide 
Convention”).2 As Gambia has not directly suffered from the atrocities 
of Myanmar, in material terms, this move by Gambia may be 
characterised as gratuitous like that of a good Samaritan—a person who 
helps strangers when they have trouble.3 This case has put the I.C.J. 
(widely referred to as the World’s Court) at center stage to dispense 
justice for Rohingya. Ideally, the I.C.J. will bring about change to the 
desperate conditions experienced by the Rohingya, illuminating the life 
of those bereft of any real hope for tomorrow. 
Furthermore, this case presents an opportunity to shed light on 
those that support or condone Myanmar’s atrocious crimes. Powerful 
states, such as China,4 Russia,5 and India,6 have helped solidify 
Myanmar’s position because of its close economic and strategic ties 
with Myanmar’s government. 
 
 1.  D. Wes Rist, What Does the ICJ Decision on The Gambia v. Myanmar 
Mean?, 24 ASIL INSIGHTS 2 (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/2/what-does-icj-decision-gambia-v-
myanmar-mean. 
2. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
3. This is not to imply that Gambia, as a state party to the Genocide Convention, 
has no interest in ensuring the legal compliance with provisions of the Convention. 
Additionally, in some countries, there are laws requiring a person to come to the 
rescue of another who is exposed to some grave physical harm, when there is no 
danger of risk of injury to the rescuer. See John T. Pardun, Good Samaritan Laws: A 
Global Perspective, 20 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 591 (1998). 
4. See infra notes 282-89 and the accompanying text. 
5. Mike Blanchfield, China, Russia under pressure from Myanmar Rohingya 
genocide ruling: Bob Rae, NATIONAL POST (Jan. 23, 2020), 
https://nationalpost.com/pmn/news-pmn/canada-news-pmn/canada-applauds-
international-court-decision-on-myanmar-rohingya-genocide. 
6. Why India did not raise Rohingya issue during Modi’s Myanmar visit, 
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Part I provides a detailed background of the persecution of the 
Rohingyas in Myanmar. Part II explains why and how Gambia moved 
to the I.C.J., seeking justice for the Rohingyas. Part III describes the 
claims brought before the I.C.J. by Gambia and Myanmar’s response. 
Part IV analyzes the salient features of the I.C.J.’s provisional orders 
passed on January 23, 2020, and what the orders suggest as to the 
I.C.J.’s final judgment. Part V sheds some light on what a judgment in 
upholding Gambia’s claims may practically mean for the persecuted 
Rohingya. 
I. BACKGROUND AND CURRENT CRISIS OF THE ROHINGYA PEOPLE 
The plight of the Rohingya in Rakhine today has a long history 
behind it. To understand this, one needs to look at the ethnic make-up 
and history of Myanmar. Generally speaking, the term “Rohingya” 
refers to the Muslim population from the Northern Rakhine State living 
in Myanmar who have their distinct language and cultural practices.7 
To understand this, one needs to look at the ethnic make-up and history 
of Myanmar.8 The Rohingya form a racial, linguistic, and religious 
minority, and have been subjected to recurring persecution and forced 
displacement for centuries.9 Such assaults have commenced since 1784, 
and subsequent armed confrontations during the British colonial era led 
to additional displacements after independence, which gave the 
Myanmar government to the subterfuge to deem the Rohingya as 
“illegal migrants.”10 In 1948, Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) 
obtained independence from Britain through armed conflict.11 
While tensions between the Rohingya Muslims and Buddhists in 
Rakhine State have existed for a very long time, a particularly 
 
7. Megan Specia, The Rohingya in Myanmar: How Years of Strife Grew into a 
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/13/world/asia/myanmar-rohingya-muslim.html. 
8. Id. 
9. Samuel Cheung, Migration Control and the Solutions Impasse in South and 
Southeast Asia: Implications from the Rohingya Experience, 25 J. REFUGEE STUD. 50, 
51 (2011). 
10. Id. at 51. 
11. Harrison Akins, The Two Faces of Democratization in Myanmar: A Case 
Study of the Rohingya and Burmese Nationalism, 38 J. MUSLIM MINORITY AFF., 229, 
235 (2018). 
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noticeable boiling point came in 1982 when Myanmar’s junta passed a 
law that recognized eight ethnicities who were entitled to citizenship, 
with the exclusion of the Rohingya, although they had previously 
enjoyed at least de jure equal rights from British Rule until 1948.12 The 
Citizenship Law of 1982 states for being eligible to citizenship, a person 
must belong to one of 135 recognized national ethnic groups or that 
their ancestors must have settled in the country before 1823.13 Members 
of the Rohingya minority and other Muslim groups were neither 
included in the list of these 135 recognized ethnic groups nor could they 
document the length of their families’ settlement in Myanmar because 
of “Operation Dragon King,” launched in 1977 (conducted in Rakhine 
in 1978), the purpose of which was ostensibly to designate citizens and 
foreigners in accordance with the law and take action against illegal 
intruders.14 However, before 1962, the civil government had 
recognized 144 ethnic groups, and the Rohingya were included in 
them.15 The Government of Myanmar still denies the Rohingya 
citizenship and even excluded them from their 2014 census, refusing to 
recognize them once again.16 
Citizens of Myanmar have not shown any real concern for the 
Rohingya—who make up approximately one million out of fifty million 
people—and they seem to perceive them as intruders.17 The main ethnic 
 
12. Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya 
Crisis, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/rohingyas-
burma/540513/#Correction1. 
13. U.N. DEPT. OF ECON. AND SOC. AFF., PROMOTING INCLUSION THROUGH 
SOCIAL PROTECTION: REPORT ON THE WORLD SOCIAL SITUATION 2018, 102, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/dspd/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2018/07/1-
1.pdf. 
14. Maung Zarni & Alice Cowley, The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s 
Rohingya, 23 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 683, 707 (2014). 
15. Id.; A.K.M. Ahsan Ullah, Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar: Seeking Justice for 
the “Stateless,” 32 J. CONTEMPORARY CRIM. JUST. 285, 286 (2016). 
16. Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, BBC NEWS, 
(Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41566561; Specia, supra note 
7. 
17. Md. Rizwanul Islam, ASEAN Must Show Its Mettle over the Rohingya 
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groups living in Myanmar are the Bamar, Karen, Shan, Mon, Chin, 
Kachin, Rakhine and Karenni.18 Other ethnic groups with substantial 
numbers include the Pa-O, Wa, Kokang, Palaung, Akha, and Lahu.19 
Due to the Rohingya’s lack of citizenship rights and systemic 
persecution in Myanmar, the Rohingya have fled from their homes in 
Myanmar to Bangladesh in several exoduses. The persecution of 
Rohingya has continued unabated for many years because of domestic 
support and the international community’s inertia.20 There appears to 
be a direct nexus between the Myanmar military and the origin of the 
systemic atrocities on the Rohingya. Military brutality and 
discrimination directed toward the Rohingya have been a norm for a 
long time but the first wave of large scale violence occurred in 1977. 21 
This first wave marks the starting point of today’s crisis.22 In 1977, the 
Burmese government “cracked down” on illegal immigration, resulting 
in killings, mass arrests, torture, and other abuses against the Rohingya 
Muslims.23 This resulted in more than 200,000 Rohingya Muslims 
fleeing to Bangladesh.24 Myanmar’s junta’s narrative was that around 
20,000 “Bengalis” fled to Bangladesh to avert Myanmar’s examination 
of their legal status.25 Resource constraints inhibited Bangladesh’s 
government and it did not have a favorable attitude towards the 
Rohingya. 26  Bangladesh repatriated the Rohingya back to Myanmar 
 
18. Minority Rights Group International, World Directory of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples – Myanmar/Burma, REFWORLD (Sept. 2017), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4954ce41c.html. 
19. Id. 
20. Md. Rizwanul Islam, Rohingya Crisis: Sanctions Must Target Myanmar 
Leadership, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017, 7:11 PM), 
https://www.nst.com.my/opinion/columnists/2017/10/286818/rohingya-crisis-
sanctions-must-target-myanmar-leadership; Islam, ASEAN Must Show Its Mettle, 
supra note 17. 
21. Engy Abdelkader, The Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar: Past, Present, and 
Future, 15 OR. REV. INT’L. L. 101, 103 (2013). 
22. See id. 
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against their will in 1979.27 The next Rohingya exodus from Myanmar 
occurred between 1991 to 1992 when roughly 250,000 Rohingya 
crossed to the Cox’s Bazar region in Bangladesh.28 The Bangladeshi 
government issued an executive order declaring the Rohingya to be 
designated as prima facie refugees solely because they were Muslim.29 
However, in 2000, the Bangladeshi government enacted a contentious 
repatriation program resulting in the repatriation of almost 250,000 
Rohingya to Myanmar.30 
Bangladesh experienced a third wave of arrivals in June 2012, after 
lethal sectarian violence erupted in the Rakhine State between ethnic 
Arakan Buddhists, the Rohingya, and other Muslims.31 The sectarian 
violence flared after the rape and murder of a Buddhist woman in May 
2012, which was then followed by revenge attacks against the 
Rohingya.32 During this time, there was widespread use of Facebook to 
spread hate speech and incite violence.33 This round of violence 
escalated and eventually resulted in a virtually state-sanctioned attack 
against the Rohingya and other Muslims living in Rakhine.34 In October 
2015, the International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School and 
Fortify Rights, a human rights NGO, published a legal report finding 
“strong evidence” the Myanmar Army, Air Force, Police Force, and 
armed civilians collectively committed genocidal acts in Myanmar.35 
 
27. See id; Katie Dock, Breaking a Cycle of Exodus: Past Failures to Protect 
Rohingya Refugees Should Shape Future Solutions, STIMSON (June 21, 2020), 
https://www.stimson.org/2020/breaking-a-cycle-of-exodus/. 
28. Cheung, supra note 9, at 3; see id. at 103 n.13. 
29. Cheung, supra note 9, at 3. 
30. Id. 
31. All You Can Do is Pray: Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing of 
Rohingya Muslims in Burma’s Arakan State, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 22, 2013), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/22/all-you-can-do-pray/crimes-against-
humanity-and-ethnic-cleansing-rohingya-muslims. 
32. Specia, supra note 7. 
33. Emma Irving, Suppressing Atrocity Speech on Social Media, 113 AM. J. 
INT’L L. UNBOUND 256, 256 (2019) (observing that social media companies should 
make more concerted efforts towards self-regulation, given the lack of any coherent 
national and international legal response and the role social media companies play in 
acting as a conduit for inciting atrocities). 
34. Specia, supra note 7. 
35. Alina Lindblom et al., Persecution of the Rohingya Muslims: Is Genocide 
Occurring in Myanmar’s Rakhine State? ALLARD K. LOWENSTEIN INT’L HUMAN 
7
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Accordingly, it recommended the United Nations adopt a resolution to 
establish a commission of inquiry on the human rights situation in 
Rakhine.36 On November 22, 2017,  then acting United States Secretary 
of State, Rex Tillerson, issued a press statement observing that “[a]fter 
a careful and thorough analysis of available facts, it is clear that the 
situation in northern Rakhine State constitutes ethnic cleansing against 
the Rohingya.”37 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”), more than 723,000 Rohingya have fled to Bangladesh 
since August 2017.38 Kutupalong, the largest refugee settlement in the 
world, alone is home to more than 600,000 refugees.39 The Rohingya 
exodus has strained Bangladesh’s fledgling economy and 
infrastructure. The enormity of the exodus can be appreciated from the 
fact that from mid-August to early October 2017, more Rohingya had 
fled to Bangladesh than those fleeing from conflict and war-ridden 
countries in the Middle East and Africa to Europe through the 
Mediterranean Sea in 2016.40 On this occasion, Bangladeshis initially 
tolerated, if not welcomed the Rohingya, and many Bangladeshis seem 
to have a favorable opinion in sheltering the persecuted Rohingyas.41 
 




37. Press Release, Rex Tillerson, U.S. Dept. of State, Efforts to Address 
Burma’s Rakhine State Crisis (Nov. 22, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/3P4H-SAVL. 
38. Kamrul Hasan, Rohingya Crisis: Population exploding as 91,000 babies are 
born in two years, DHAKA TRIB. (Aug. 29, 2019), 
https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/rohingya-crisis/2019/08/29/rohingya-
crisis-population-exploding-as-91-000-babies-are-born-in-two-years. 
39. Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, supra note 16. 
40. Md. Rizwanul Islam, Sanctions Must Target Myanmar Leadership, supra 
note 20. 
41. Md. Rizwanul Islam, The Rohingya imbroglio, THE INDEPENDENT  (Dec. 5, 
2016), 
http://dspace.bracu.ac.bd/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10361/7956/The%20Independent_
05%20December%202016.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y; Abu Afsarul Haider, 
Rohingya - A people not wanted anywhere, THE DAILY STAR (Jan. 26, 2019, 12:00 
AM), https://www.thedailystar.net/opinion/human-rights/news/rohingya-people-not-
wanted-anywhere-1692907; Tazreena Sajjad, As Bangladesh Hosts over a Million 
Rohingya Refugees, a Scholar Explains What Wotivated the Country to Open up Its 
8
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However, many Bangladeshis still harbor strong resentments in letting 
Rohingyas continue to shelter in Bangladesh because of the strain on 
the Cox’s Bazar region’s resources.42 Further, many Bangladeshis 
perceive the Rohingya as criminals or believe that some of them travel 
abroad on fake Bangladeshi passports and commit crimes, which 
undermines the image of Bangladesh.43 Thus, most Rohingyas living in 
Bangladesh are bereft of any proper work opportunities44 and have a 
bare minimum existence with little hope for a meaningful life in 
Bangladesh. 
According to a 2019 report by United Nations investigators, the 
Rohingya within Rakhine remain in “deplorable” conditions and face a 
“serious risk of genocide.”45 This report accused Myanmar’s military 
of “harbor[ing] genocidal intent” towards the Rohingya and renewed 
“war crimes,” including forced labor and torture against civilians.46 
Myanmar’s military claims that it is carrying out attacks on the 
Rohingya to “root out” rebels and bring stability to the country.47 In 
reality, Myanmar damages its own security far more than any claimed 
gains by trampling on its citizens’ human rights.48 Further, Myanmar’s 
military has shown itself to be incapable of maintaining peace and 
security within its own borders.49 The violence perpetrated on the 
 
Borders, THE CONVERSATION, (Oct. 6, 2020), https://theconversation.com/as-
bangladesh-hosts-over-a-million-rohingya-refugees-a-scholar-explains-what-
motivated-the-country-to-open-up-its-borders-133609. 
42. Islam, ASEAN Must Show Its Mettle, supra note 17; A Sustainable Policy 
for Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh, INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (Dec. 27, 
2019), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/bangladesh/303-sustainable-
policy-rohingya-refugees-bangladesh; Bangladesh: Rohingya Refugees Stranded at 
Sea, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 25, 2020, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/04/25/bangladesh-rohingya-refugees-stranded-sea. 
43. Islam, The Rohingya imbroglio, supra note 41. 
44. See Kathryn Reid et. al, Rohingya refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs, and how to 
help, WORLD VISION https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/rohingya-
refugees-bangladesh-facts (last updated June 12, 2020). 
45. Elise Carlson-Rainer & Anish Goel, Myanmar’s Military Is Only Hurting 
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Rohingya may actually help some extremist groups to hire disillusioned 
young Rohingyas.50 Currently, with more than half a million Rohingya 
believed to be still living in Myanmar’s northern Rakhine province, 
U.N. investigators warn there is a “serious risk [] genocidal actions may 
occur or recur.”51 As of March 2019, Bangladesh announced it would 
no longer accept any Rohingya fleeing Myanmar.52 
II. THE GAMBIA TAKING MYANMAR TO THE I.C.J. 
The neighboring Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”) members have mildly protested against Myanmar’s 
treatment of the Rohingya and some powerful states such as China, 
India, and Russia have jockeyed for influence in Myanmar to advance 
their economic interests.53 In examining the international communities 
response to the atrocities against the Rohingyas, it is remarkable that a 
small African country with no direct nexus to the atrocities—Gambia—
has sought to avenge the Rohingyan cause. It was somewhat by chance 
that Abubacarr Marie Tambadou (“Tambadou”), the Attorney-General 
and Minister of Justice of Gambia visited the Rohingya in 
Bangladesh.54 The travails of the Rohingya moved Tambadou, and 
eventually with support from other member states of the Organization 
of Islamic Cooperation (“OIC”), Gambia decided to take the matter to 
the I.C.J.55 In May 2019, Tambadou introduced a resolution to the OIC 
Committee to inspect alleged abuses against the Rohingya and 
 
50. Wa Lone & Antoni Slodkowski, ‘And then they exploded’: How Rohingya 
insurgents built support for assault, REUTERS (Sept. 6, 2017, 7:14 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-insurgents-insight/and-then-
they-exploded-how-rohingya-insurgents-built-support-for-assault-idUSKCN1BI06J. 
51. Myanmar Rohingya: What you need to know about the crisis, supra note 16. 
52. Rohingya Crisis: Bangladesh will no longer take in Myanmar refugees, 
BBC NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47412704. 
53. Md. Rizwanul Islam, Gambia’s Genocide Case Against Myanmar: A Legal 
Review, THE DIPLOMAT (Nov. 19, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/gambias-
genocide-case-against-myanmar-a-legal-review/. 
54. Shola Lawal, Tiny Gambia stands up for the Rohingya, AFRICA INSIDERS 
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convinced the 57-member organization to back a formal case against 
Myanmar.56 
Gambia filed its I.C.J. application on November 11, 2019. The 
application concerns acts the Government of Myanmar perpetrated and 
condoned against members of the Rohingya.57 These acts include 
killing, causing serious bodily and mental harm, inflicting conditions 
that are calculated to bring about physical destruction, imposing 
measures to prevent births, and forcible transfers.58 In its I.C.J. 
application, Gambia argues these acts are genocidal in character 
because  it is attempting to destroy the Rohingya, in whole or in part.59 
Myanmar’s government violated the Genocide Convention by 
committing these acts against the Rohingya.60 Under Article II of the 
Genocide Convention: 
genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures 
intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring 
children of the group to another group.61 
Polish scholar Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” in his 
book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, which was published during the 
 
56. Aaron Ross, With memories of Rwanda: The Gambian minister taking on 
Suu Kyi, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2019) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya-world-court-gambia/with-memories-of-rwanda-the-gambian-minister-
taking-on-suu-kyi-idUSKBN1Y91HA. 
57. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures 
(Gam. v. Myan.), Application, 2019 I.C.J. 2 (Nov. 11) https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf (hereinafter Gambia 
v. Myanmar Application). 
58. Id. at 4. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. 
61. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
art. II, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
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Second World War.62 The prosecutor at the International Military 
Tribunal in Nuremberg used the term genocide in some speeches, but 
the term was not used in the London Charter establishing the 
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal or in the judgment.63 
Beyond the Genocide Convention, the U.N. General Assembly 
Outcome Document of the Summit of Heads of State and Government 
of September 16, 2005 (at the level of Heads of State and Government 
of U.N. member states) casts an important legal duty upon states in the 
realm of state responsibility (widely known as the responsibility to 
protect).64 This instrument affirmed state’s responsibility to protect 
against genocide both within and beyond borders.65 It proclaims that 
every state has the legal responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, and this responsibility would necessitate “the prevention of 
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means.”66 Gambia may argue that the extraterritorial and 
collective responsibility entails that states are obliged to take actions 
collectively “in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a 
case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide.”67 
 
62. See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF 
OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS xi (1st ed.1944). 
63. Yuval Shany, The Road to the Genocide Convention and Beyond, THE UN 
GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 3, 7 (Paola Gaeta ed., 1st ed. 2009). 
64. G.A. Res. 60(1), ¶ 138 (Oct. 24, 2005). For commentaries on this, see 
Carsten Stahn, Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm, 
101 AM. J. INT’L L. 99 (2007); Alicia L. Bannon, The Responsibility to Protect: The 
U.N. World Summit and the Question of Unilateralism, 115 YALE L.J. 1157 (2006). 
65. G.A. Res. 60(1), ¶ 138 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. ¶ 139. However, the political and strategic considerations have meant 
that the international community of states have hardly succeeded in honoring this 
responsibility; see Aidan Hehir, The Permanence of I of Inconsistency: Libya, the 
Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect, 38 INT’L SEC. 137-159 (2013).   
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Myanmar violated other essential obligations under the Genocide 
Convention.68  Gambia’s petition alleged Myanmar attempted to 
commit genocide, conspired to commit genocide, incited genocide, was 
complicit in genocide, and failed to prevent and punish genocide.69 
Gambia was mindful of the jus cogens70 character of the prohibition of 
genocide and the erga omnes or erga omnes partes71 character of the 
obligations that are owed under the Genocide Convention.72 Therefore, 
Gambia instituted proceedings to establish Myanmar’s responsibility 
for violations of the Genocide Convention, “to hold it [] accountable 
under international law for its genocidal acts against the Rohingya,” and 
to utilize the Court to guarantee the maximum “possible protection for 
those who remain at grave risk from future acts of genocide.”73 
Regarding the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction, Gambia argued that both 
Gambia and Myanmar are State Parties to the Genocide Convention.74 
The Genocide Convention requires each State Party have an interest to 
comply in any given case. Gambia has standing because any State Party 
to the Genocide Convention may invoke the obligation of another State 
Party to determine the alleged failure to comply with its obligations 
erga omnes partes and to bring that failure to an end. 
The Court concluded Gambia has prima facie standing to submit 
its dispute to the I.C.J. with Myanmar on the basis of alleged violations 
of obligations under the Genocide Convention.75 The petition was 
asserted pursuant to Article 36(1) of the I.C.J. Statute and Article IX of 
 
68. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures 
(Gam. v. Myan.), Application, 2019 I.C.J. 4 (Nov. 11) https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf. 
69. Id. 
70. Jus cogens means peremptory norms of international law. See Gordon A. 
Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 
28 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (1988). 
71. Erga omnes or erga omne partes obligations are obligations owed to the 
community of states, not to a particular state. CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING 
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005). 
72. Gam. v. Myan., Application, 2019 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 15 (Nov. 11). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 12, ¶ 17. 
75. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. 28, ¶ 42 (Jan. 23), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf 
(hereinafter Gambia v. Myanmar Order). 
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the Genocide Convention, and accordingly, the Court had jurisdiction 
to hear Gambia’s claims.76 
Article IX has been invoked before the I.C.J. on a few occasions.77 
Gambia’s situation was unique because it was the first time a State Party 
invoked Article IX when its own nationals were not the alleged victims 
of either genocide or another violation of any provision of the Genocide 
Convention.78 
III. THE GAMBIA’S CLAIMS AND MYANMAR’S RESPONSE 
Gambia argued Myanmar, through its state organs, agents, and 
other persons and entities acting on the instructions of or under the 
direction and control of Myanmar, is liable for violating its obligations 
under Articles I, III, IV, V, and VI of the Genocide Convention.79 
Specifically, the alleged violations of the Genocide Convention include, 
but are not limited to: 
committing genocide in violation of Article III(a); conspiring to 
commit genocide in violation of Article III(b); directly and publicly 
inciting to commit genocide in violation of Article III(c); attempting 
to commit genocide in violation of Article III(d); complying in 
genocide in violation of Article III(e); failing to prevent genocide in 
violation of Article I; failing to punish genocide in violation of 
 
76. Id. ¶ 3. 
77. See, e.g., Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pak. v. India), Pleadings, 1973 
I.C.J. 328 (May 11); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 
I.C.J. Rep. (Feb. 26); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Yugoslavia), Application, 1999 I.C.J. 
(July 2). 
78. Questions and Answers on Gambia’s Genocide Case Against Myanmar 
before the International Court of Justice, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/12/05/questions-and-answers-gambias-genocide-
case-against-myanmar-international-court#_Why_is_this. In this regard, Pakistan’s 
allegation was not that its citizens were victims of genocide, rather it argued that that 
under the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Genocide Convention, 1948, India 
was legally obliged to promptly repatriate prisoners of war which the latter failed to 
comply. See Md. Rizwanul Islam, Justice for Bangladesh: Pakistan’s Little 
Remembered Promise, THE DIPLOMAT (May 11, 2017), 
https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/justice-for-bangladesh-pakistans-little-
remembered-promise/. 
79. Gam. v. Myan., Application, 2019 I.C.J. 56, ¶ 111. 
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Articles I, IV, and VI; and failing to enact the necessary legislation 
to give effect to the provisions of the Genocide Convention and to 
provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any 
of the acts enumerated in Article III.80 
Gambia cites an Independent International Fact-Finding Mission 
on Myanmar (“IIFFMM”), which the UNHRC established in March 
2017. The purpose of the IIFFMM was “to establish the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the alleged recent human rights violations 
by military and security forces in Myanmar.”81 The damning 
observations of the independent body published in September 2019 
found Myanmar failed to perform its obligations to prevent, investigate, 
and punish genocide and failed to have effective legislation 
criminalizing and punishing genocide.82 Gambia added that Myanmar 
was aware the IIFFMM established by the UNHRC welcomed the 
efforts of States, specifically Bangladesh and Gambia, and the OIC “to 
encourage and pursue a case against Myanmar before the Court under 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide.”83 Gambia alleged Myanmar entirely rejected the IIFFMM 
reports and the conclusions contained therein.84 
Although Gambia made clear it believed Myanmar’s actions 
constituted a clear violation of its obligations under the Convention, 
Myanmar rejected any suggestion it violated the Genocide Convention 
and denied any government wrongdoing.85 Myanmar also contended 
that because of its reservations to Articles VI and VIII of the Genocide 
Convention, the I.C.J. lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter.86 
 
80. Id. 
81. U.N. Human Rights Council, Independent International Fact-Finding 
Mission on Myanmar, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/MyanmarFFM/Pages/Index.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 8, 2020). “The mandate of the IIFFMM ended in September 2019.” Id. 
82. Human Rights Council, Detailed findings of the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/42/50, ¶ 9 (Sept. 16, 2019). 
83. Id. ¶ 40. 
84. See Gam. v. Myan., Application, 2019 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 21-22. 
85. Id. 
86. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan;.), Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, 2020 I.C.J. 6, 11, ¶¶ 19, 32 (Jan. 23), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-
related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
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Article VI of the Geneva Convention provides that a person 
charged with genocide shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the state 
where the offense occurs or by an international penal tribunal. In its 
reservation, Myanmar has only asserted the exclusive jurisdiction of its 
national tribunals over the trial of individuals for committing any 
offense under the Genocide Convention and nothing more.87 In the 
current case, the Gambians were not seeking to prosecute any 
Myanmarese for genocide; instead, the state of Myanmar which is on 
the dock, rendering Article VI inapplicable.88 Article VIII of the 
Genocide Convention provides the contracting parties to the 
Convention “may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations 
to take such action under the Charter of the United Nations as they 
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide.”89 Thus, it appears that this provision might only apply to 
situations where a state party seeks the intervention of the United 
Nations Security Council (“UNSC”).90 Further, “even in that situation 
it seems unsure how Myanmar’s reservation might override the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations,” which authorizes, and 
likely dictates, the UNSC’s actions.91 Any other interpretation would 
allow a party’s unilateral position to override a provision of a separate 
multilateral treaty. 
The above concept is further supported by the fact that Myanmar, 
like other states, decided against expressing reservations to Article IX 
of the Genocide Convention. Given that the I.C.J., in its Advisory 
Opinion on Reservations to the Genocide Convention, upheld the 
legality of reservations,92 such an exercise by Myanmar could have 
prohibited the I.C.J. from exercising its jurisdiction.93 However, several 
opinions from the Case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo indicate that removing I.C.J.’s jurisdiction, despite reservations, 
 
87. Islam, A Legal Review, supra note 53. 
88. Id. 
89. Genocide Convention, supra note 2, art. 8. 
90. Islam, A Legal Review, supra note 53. 
91. Id. 
92. See generally Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15 (May 28). 
93. This is because the only basis for the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction here is Article IX 
of the Genocide Convention. 
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would have been a tall task.94 It is a little uncertain even despite such a 
reservation because at least some judges of the Court would not have 
reconsidered its previous pronouncement, which is somewhat implicit 
from the separate opinion of some judges in the Case of Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo. 
In that case, a majority of the Court held that neither the erga omnes 
nor the jus cogens character of the genocide prohibition could by 
themselves confer jurisdiction because jurisdiction is based on the 
parties’ consent.95 The majority of the judges also held that the 
reservation to Article IX was compatible with the object and purpose of 
the Convention.96 However, Judge Koroma, in his dissenting opinion, 
observed that such a reservation was incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Genocide Convention.97 Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, 
Elaraby, Owada, and Simma issued a joint separate opinion observing 
that, in the future, the I.C.J. should reconsider the compatibility of 
reservations to Article IX with the object and purpose of the Genocide 
Convention in more detail.98 
Myanmar argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction under Article IX 
of the Genocide Convention because there was no direct dispute 
between the parties; Gambia filed the case merely on behalf of the 
OIC.99 In the past, the I.C.J. has held that it is empowered to issue 
provisional measures so long as there is not a manifest lack of 
jurisdiction as would be evident from the observation of the I.C.J. in the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Case that “it cannot be accepted a priori that a claim 
based on such a complaint falls completely outside the scope of 
 
94. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002), 
Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6 (Feb. 3) (hereinafter Congo Cases). 
95. Id. at 31, ¶ 64. 
96. Id. at 32, ¶¶ 66-67. 
97. Id. at 55-63, ¶¶ 11-26 (dissenting Opinion of Koroma, J.). 
98. Id. at 72, ¶ 29 (joint separate opinion by Higgins, J., Koojimans, J., Elaraby, 
J., Owada, J., Simma, J.)(“It is thus not self-evident that a reservation to Article IX 
could not be regarded as incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention 
and we believe that this is a matter that the Court should revisit for further 
consideration.”). 
99. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam.v. Myan.), Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures, 2020 I.C.J. 8, ¶ 23 (Jan. 23), https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-
related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
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international jurisdiction.”100 However, the I.C.J. seems to have 
recently shifted towards a more restrictive position on jurisdictional 
requirements. The shift began with the Nuclear Tests Cases, where it 
held that a mere prima facie showing of jurisdiction is sufficient before 
issuing provisional measures.101 
Similarly, in the Nicaragua Case, the Court observed that although 
its final satisfaction about the existence of jurisdiction is not necessary 
before issuing provisional measures, “it ought not to indicate such 
measures unless the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, prima 
facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be 
founded.”102 The I.C.J. reiterated a similar idea in the LaGrand Case.103 
Clearly, this is a rational choice because if the provisional measures are 
not preceded by at least a prima facie showing of jurisdiction, the 
I.C.J.’s later merit findings could be tarnished by lack of jurisdiction. 
Therefore, as the I.C.J. has issued provisional measures, it seems to 
have rejected Myanmar’s assertion that there is no direct dispute with 
Gambia.104 Of particular importance is a Note Verbale of October 11, 
2019, from Gambia’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations to 
Myanmar’s Permanent Mission, expressing concerns over the findings 
of the IIFFMM and Myanmar’s corresponding rejection.105 This 
conclusion that there is a legal dispute between the parties in this case 
 
100. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), Interim Measures, 1951 I.C.J. 
Rep. 89, 93 (July 5) (hereinafter Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case). 
101. See Nuclear Tests Case (Austrl. v. Fr.), Request for the Indication of 
Interim Measures of Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 99, 101, ¶ 13 (June 22); see also 
Nuclear Tests Case (N.Z. v. Fr.), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of 
Protection Order, 1973 I.C.J. 135, 137 ¶ 14 (June 22). 
102. U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 169, 175, ¶ 14 (May 10). For a detailed 
background of the case, see generally Abram Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, 
and the World Court, 85 COLUM.. L. REV. 1445 (1985). 
103. See LaGrand Case (Ger. v. U.S.), Merits, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 13, ¶ 13. (Mar. 3). 
See also Sir Robert Jennings, The LaGrand Case, 1 L. & PRACTICE OF INT’L COURTS 
& TRIBUNALS 13 (2002) (providing a detailed background of the LaGrand Case). 
104. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. 10 (Jan. 23), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
105. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures 
(Gam. v. Myan.), Application, 2019 I.C.J. 16, ¶ ¶ 21-22 (Nov. 11), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf. 
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may be further supported by the finding of the Court in Belgium v. 
Senegal that in the context of torture, each State Party has an interest in 
compliance with provisions of the Convention. Thus, that case 
establishes that there exists “the entitlement of each State [P]arty to the 
Convention to make a claim concerning the cessation of an alleged 
breach by another State [P]arty,” as Gambia has asserted.106 Hence, 
“every state party can have ‘standing’ to invoke the responsibility of 
another State Party without the requirement of having any ‘special 
interest.’”107 Even from a normative policy point of view, as state 
agents may more often than not be involved in perpetrating genocide, it 
is perhaps important that the standing of a state in bringing cases at the 
I.C.J. on atrocious crimes such as genocide is viewed in a liberal 
manner. Otherwise, determining state responsibility for genocide may 
remain beyond the reach of the I.C.J. 
IV. THE PROVISIONAL ORDER OF THE I.C.J. IN LIGHT OF THE COURT’S 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Although Myanmar ratified the Genocide Convention with 
reservations to Article VIII, it does not deprive Gambia of the 
possibility to bring its dispute with Myanmar to the I.C.J. under Article 
IX of the Convention.108 Article VIII of the Genocide Convention 
provides that “[a]ny Contracting Party may call upon the competent 
organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of 
the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and 
suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in 
Article III.” Regarding Myanmar’s proposition that reservations to 
Article VIII apply to the jurisdiction of the I.C.J., the Court accepted it 
could be included within the definition of the words “competent organs 
of the United Nations.”109 The context of this article is different.110 
Article VIII’s use of the words “calling upon to act” indicates there are 
competent political organs within the United Nations, which could act 
to prevent or suppress genocidal acts.111 On the other hand, Article IX 
 
106. Id. at 62, ¶ 124. 
107. Id. 
108. Gam. v. Myan., Order, 2020 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 36 (Jan. 23). 
109. Id. at 11, ¶ 35. 
110. Id. at 12, ¶ 35. 
111. Id. at 11, ¶ 35. 
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specifically addresses the issue of adjudication of disputes between 
parties to the Convention, and thus, the individual procedural rules 
controlled by these two articles are distinct. Therefore, Article VIII may 
not necessarily inhibit the application of Article IX.112 
Gambia’s I.C.J. application contained a request for the 
implementation of provisional orders, submitted pursuant to Article 41 
of the I.C.J. Statute and Articles 73, 74, and 75 of the Rules of Court. 
The request was made to preserve the rights Gambia claims under the 
Convention, while the Court’s final decision in the case remains 
pending.113 The I.C.J.’s power to issue a provisional order is a special 
discretionary power which it may resort to only in exceptional 
circumstances.114 This power is evident from the following words in 
Article 41(1) of the Statute of the I.C.J., which states that “if [the Court] 
considers that circumstances so require,” it may issue a provisional 
order. As long as the I.C.J. may exercise ratione personae and ratione 
materiae jurisdiction over a matter, the power to implement provisional 
orders is deemed to be an inherent power of international courts and 
tribunals like that of their domestic counterparts.115 The I.C.J.  Statute 
clarifies the purpose of the provisional order is to “preserve the 
respective rights of either party,” pending the final judgement of the 
Court.116 Thus, it is implicit in these wordings that provisional orders 
are not necessarily judgments on the respective claims by the parties. 
Rather, these orders serve as a stopgap measure to ensure that the value 
of the final judgment is not diminished by the continuing acts of the 
parties pending the final judgment. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases, 
the I.C.J. has further observed that aside from preserving the rights of 
the respective parties, provisional measures “presuppose[] that 
irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the 
subject of dispute in judicial proceedings and that the Court’s judgment 
should not be anticipated by reason of any initiative regarding the 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 2, ¶ 4. 
114. Id. at 19, ¶ 65. 
115. Judgment No. 2867 of the Administrative Tribunal of the International 
Labour Organization upon a Complaint against the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 1, 16 ¶ 35. (Oct. 29), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/146/16743.pdf. 
116. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41(1), Oct. 24, 1945, 33 
U.N.T.S. 993. 
20
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss1/4
Updated_Islam camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021  11:02 AM 
2020] THE GAMBIA V. MYANMAR AT THE I.C.J.  97 
measures which are in issue.”117 In a number of cases, the Court has 
stressed the nexus between an irreparable loss to be incurred by a party 
and the need for a provisional order.118 There is a clear conflict between 
the first and the last of these three aspects in the pronouncement of the 
I.C.J. in this case. If a provisional order is implemented to preserve the 
respective rights of the parties, then the order would serve as I.C.J.’s 
preliminary determination of the rights of the parties, and so the third 
statement that the final judgment should not be interpreted cannot stand. 
However, these three prongs can be read disjunctively, and not all of 
them may be at play in a single case.119 
Another discernible trend of the Court exercising its jurisdiction to 
issue provisional orders on the ground of irreparable loss has been under 
humane consideration, which is evident inter alia, in the LaGrand Case, 
the Avena and other Mexican Nationals Case, and the Armed Activities 
in Congo Case.120 In all three cases, the lives of individuals were at 
issue, and the I.C.J. went on to issue provisional orders. The I.C.J. in 
Ukraine v. Russia, has further clarified that “power of the Court to 
indicate provisional [orders] will be exercised only if there is urgency 
[meaning] there is a real and imminent risk that there will be irreparable 
prejudice to the rights in dispute before the [I.C.J.] provides a final 
 
117. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Germ. v. Ice.), Interim Measures, 1972 I.C.J. 
34, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Interim Measures, 1972 
I.C.J. 12, 16, ¶ 21 (Aug. 17) (hereinafter Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases). 
118. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case 
(U.S. v. Iran), Request for the Indication of  Provisional Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 19, 
¶ 36 (Dec. 15); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide Case (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Further 
Provisional Measures, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 342 ¶ 35 (Sept. 13); The Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S. ), Provisional Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248, 257, ¶¶ 
35-36 (Apr. 9); LaGrand Case, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Ger.v. 
U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1999 I.C.J. 9, 14, ¶¶ 22-24 (Mar. 3); Armed Activities 
on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Provisional Measures, 
2000 I.C.J. 111 127-128, ¶¶ 39, 43 (July 1); Avena and Other Mexican Nationals Case 
(Mex. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 2003 I.C.J. 77, 89-91, ¶¶ 49, 55 (Feb. 5). 
119. If they are to be read conjunctively then, as is explained here, there could 
be a clear conflict between the first and third prong. 
120. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF Justice, HANDBOOK 6, 63 (7th ed. 2018),  
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/publications/handbook-of-the-court-en.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2020). 
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decision.”121 In this case, the Court decided that restrictions on the 
Mejlis (a self-governing body of the Crimean Tatar people in Crimea) 
in the ability of Tatars to choose representative institutions, and 
restrictions on the availability of Ukrainian-language education in 
Crimean schools, posed the threat of irreparable harm.122 While both of 
these are matters of important civil and political rights, there was no 
immediate danger to human lives in either of them, and by accepting 
them as sufficient grounds for issuing provisional order, the I.C.J. might 
have signaled that even in the absence of any immediate danger to 
human lives, it may issue a provisional order. 
Despite ambiguity of the I.C.J.’s authority to issue binding 
provisional orders,123 the dispute over this authority has been settled in 
LaGrand, where the Court unambiguously held that provisional orders 
are binding on the parties.124 The Court reasoned it was the object and 
purpose of its Statute to ensure that litigants refrain from actions that 
might have a prejudicial effect in executing its final judgment.125 In 
light of this decision, Gambia requested the I.C.J. to specify provisional 
measures that would effectively protect their claim and prevent 
aggravation or extension of the dispute pending final judgment.126 
Gambia argued the I.C.J. had prima facie jurisdiction to indicate 
provisional orders because Gambia and Myanmar dispute the 
interpretation, application, and fulfillment of their obligations under the 
Genocide Convention.127 
Additionally, Myanmar raised the issue of the required evidentiary 
threshold for the I.C.J. to issue its provisional measures. Myanmar 
 
121. Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukr. v. Russ.), Request for the Indication of 
Provisional Measures, 2017 I.C.J. 104, 136, ¶ 89 (Apr. 19). 
122. Id. at 138-40, ¶¶ 97, 98, 106. 
123. See Eelco Szabo, Provisional Measures in the World Court: Binding or 
Bound to Be Ineffective?, 10 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 475 (1997) (discussing the debate of 
the binding nature of the ICJ’s provisional orders). 
124. LaGrand Case (Ger.v. U.S.), Judgment, 2001 I.C.J. 466, 502-503, ¶¶ 102-
03 (June 27). 
125. Id. 
126. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. 4, 14, ¶¶ 12, 46 (Jan. 23), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
127. Id. at 12, ¶ 37. 
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maintained that the I.C.J. must consider the exceptional gravity of the 
alleged violations in assessing whether the required level of plausibility 
was met.128 In this regard, if the evidence in support of the application 
can support alternative inferences contrary to the alleged genocidal 
conduct, then the I.C.J. must conclude the claims concerning genocide 
are not plausible.129 In view of the function of provisional measures to 
safeguard the respective rights of either party pending its final 
judgment, the I.C.J. did not consider that the exceptional gravity of the 
allegations is a decisive factor warranting the determination of the 
existence of genocidal intent.130 The I.C.J. observed that the facts and 
circumstances mentioned above are satisfactory to conclude the rights 
and allegations claimed by Gambia are plausible.131  These rights and 
allegations are the right of the Rohingya in Myanmar to be protected 
from acts of genocide and related prohibited acts mentioned in Article 
III, and the right of Gambia to seek compliance by Myanmar with its 
obligations not to commit and to prevent and punish genocide in 
accordance with the Convention.132 The reference to the facts and 
circumstances imply the I.C.J. has not limited itself to the legal 
plausibility, but has also considered the factual plausibility of  
Myanmar’s claims. This is a form of rudimentary assessment on the 
merits. 
Gambia specifically argued that the Rohingya remaining in 
Myanmar face serious threats to their existence, placing them in vital 
need of protection.133 Myanmar denied that a real and imminent risk of 
irreparable prejudice exists in the present case, since repatriation 
initiatives have been taken by the country for the return of displaced 
Rohingya presently in Bangladesh, whose support would not be 
forthcoming if there was an imminent or ongoing risk of genocide, as 
well as trying to bring about stability within the Rakhine State.134 
Nevertheless, the Court has been of the opinion that the Rohingya in 
 
128. Id. at 15, ¶ 47. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 18, ¶ 56. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for Provisional Measures 
(Gam. v. Myan.), Application, 2019 I.C.J. 54-56, ¶ 110 (Nov. 11), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20191111-APP-01-00-EN.pdf. 
134. Gam. v. Myan., Order, 2020 I.C.J. at 20, ¶ 68. 
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Myanmar remain extremely vulnerable.135 The Court has also noted that 
Myanmar did not present concrete measures aimed particularly at 
recognizing and ensuring the right of the Rohingya to exist as a 
protected group under the Genocide Convention.136 The Court has 
observed that regardless of the situation that Myanmar’s government is 
facing in the Rakhine State, Myanmar remains under the obligations 
incumbent upon it as a State Party to the Genocide Convention.137 The 
Court, hence, has been of the view that Myanmar must take strong 
measures to guarantee the preservation of any evidence related to 
allegations of acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.138 Indeed, the I.C.J. ordered that: 
Myanmar shall in accordance with its obligations under the Genocide 
Convention, in relation to the Rohingya group in its territory, take all 
measures to prevent the commission of all acts within the scope of 
Article II of this Convention, specifically: (a) killing members of the 
group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to the members of 
the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
and (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group.139 
Myanmar shall also ensure that its military, as well as any irregular 
armed units, do not commit any criminal activities, including 
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide, attempt to commit genocide, or complicity in genocide 
against the Rohingya.140 Likewise, Myanmar must take effective 
measures to prevent the destruction and ensure the preservation of 
evidence related to allegations of acts within the scope of Article II of 
the Genocide Convention.141 Lastly, Myanmar is required to submit a 
report to the I.C.J. on all measures taken to give effect to this order 
 
135. Id. at  21, ¶ 72. 
136. Id. at 22, ¶ 73. 
137. Id. at 22, ¶ 74. 
138. Id. at 23, ¶ 81. 
139. Id. at 23, ¶ 79. 
140. Id. at 23, ¶ 80. 
141. Id. at 24, ¶ 82. 
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within four months, as from the date of the order, and thereafter every 
six months, until a final judgment is rendered.142 
The I.C.J. considered the direct link between the rights claimed and 
the provisional measures requested. It reasoned that the first three 
provisional measures sought by Gambia are aimed at inter alia, 
preserving the rights it asserts under the Genocide Convention. This 
includes the right of the Rohingya group to be protected from genocide 
and other acts mentioned in Articles II and III, and requires that 
Myanmar preserve evidence.143 Under the provisional measures, the 
I.C.J. indicates Myanmar shall take effective measures to prevent the 
destruction and ensure the preservation of evidence related to 
allegations of acts within the scope of Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.144 In particular, “on the preservation of the standard of 
evidence, while there will continue to be concerns [pertaining] to access 
[principally] for the Independent Investigative Mechanism for 
Myanmar and the International Criminal Court [(“I.C.C.”)], this order 
places an [obvious] legal obligation on Myanmar.”145 New technology 
used by rights organizations may assist in tracking and recording any 
corrosion of evidence.146 
The I.C.J. has considered Gambian prayers aim to preserve the 
rights asserted in the Genocide Convention.147 Specifically, the right of 
the Rohingya and its members to be protected from acts of genocide 
and other acts mentioned in Article III, and the right of Gambia to see 
Myanmar comply with its legal obligations to prevent and punish acts 
identified and prohibited under Articles II and III of the Convention.148 
The I.C.J. decided there was an insufficient link between the rights 
Gambia seeks to protect and the purposes of the fourth and fifth 
provisional measures.149 In addition, the sixth provisional measure 
requested by Gambia was not necessary under the circumstances of the 
 
142. Id. at 23-24, ¶ 82. 
143. Id. at 19, ¶ 61. 
144. Id. at 23, ¶ 81. 
145. Priya Pillai, ICJ Order on Provisional Measures: The Gambia v. 
Myanmar, Opinio Juris, (Jan. 24, 2020), http://opiniojuris.org/2020/01/24/icj-order-
on-provisional-measures-the-gambia-v-myanmar/. 
146. Id. 
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case.150 However, according to the 1982 Citizenship Law, the I.C.J. 
determined  the Rohingya in Myanmar remain extremely vulnerable.151 
In the Court’s resolution 74/246 of December 27, 2019, the U.N. 
General Assembly reiterated “that, in spite of the fact [] Rohingya 
Muslims lived in Myanmar for generations prior to the independence of 
Myanmar, they were made stateless by the enactment of the 1982 
Citizenship Law and were eventually disenfranchised, in 2015, from the 
electoral process.”152 
The 1954 Convention on the Status of Stateless Persons established 
the legal definition for stateless persons under Article 1(1): individuals 
who are not considered citizens or nationals under the operation of the 
laws of any country. Generally, a person’s citizenship and nationality 
may be determined based on the laws of a country where an individual 
is born or where his or her parents were born.153 However, a person can 
also lose citizenship and nationality in a number of ways, including 
when a country stops to exist, or when a country adopts nationality laws 
that discriminate against certain groups.154 Nevertheless, as this Article 
discusses in Section VI(E), the power of a state in conferring and 
stripping citizenship is arguably not unfettered in contemporary 
international law. 
V. LOOKING THROUGH THE CRYSTAL BALL: WHAT THE PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES SAY (OR DO NOT SAY) ABOUT POTENTIAL JUDGMENT ON 
THE MERITS 
Despite the explicit wordings of the I.C.J., which state “judgment 
should not be anticipated,”155 provisional orders may indirectly provide 
 
150. Id. at 19, ¶ 62. 
151. Id. at 21, ¶ 72. 
152. Id. 
153. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Statelessness, 
https://www.unhcr.org/statelessness.html, (last visited Dec. 1, 2020). 
154. Id. 
155. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Germ. v. Ice.), Interim Measures, 1972 I.C.J. 
34, ¶ 22 (Aug. 17); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Interim Measures, 1972 
I.C.J. 16, ¶ 21 (Aug. 17); see also Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (U.K. v. Iran), Interim 
Measures, 1951 I.C.J. 89, 93 (July 5). This is consistent with the practice of the 
Court’s predecessor, P.C.I.J. in which The Factory at Chorzów (Interim Measures), 
2007 P.C.I.J. Rep. Series A No. 12, at 10 (Nov. 21) stating “the Court, in Judgment 
No. 8, by which it declared itself to have jurisdiction to give judgment upon the merits 
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some clues to the final judgment on the merits. Indeed, by merely 
adopting provisional measures, the I.C.J. cannot completely avoid 
prejudging, at least temporarily, until the matter is resolved.156 By 
adopting the provisional measures some may argue the Court is 
signaling that it does manifestly lack jurisdiction. Again, when the 
I.C.J. holds provisional measures it should be issued to preserve the 
rights of a party from suffering an irreparable harm, however, it may 
end up preserving a right that does not exist under the international law 
or that may not be a right belonging to the claimant state, unless it first 
establishes the existence of that right.157 
A.  Responsibility of States for Genocide 
In the Bosnia case, the I.C.J. established an important point and 
took a different approach from the holding of the Nuremberg 
International Military Tribunal, which held that it was not States, but 
individuals who commit international crimes: 
Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by 
abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced… The 
principle of international law, which under certain circumstances, 
protects the representatives of a state, cannot be applied to acts which 
are condemned as criminal by international law. The authors of these 
acts cannot shelter themselves behind their official position in order 
to be freed from punishment in appropriate proceedings.158 
In this case, the I.C.J. held States may commit the crime of 
genocide. When a State is responsible for acts of genocide, it may be 
 
in the case in question, has reserved for judgment on the merits the claims formulated 
in the Application.” 
156. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Provisional Measures of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea, 37 INDIAN J. INT’L. L. 3, 432 (1997). 
157. Dimitris Kontogiannis, Provisional Measures in Ukraine v. Russia: From 
Illusions to Reality or a Prejudgmnet in Disguise?, EJIL:TALK! (Nov. 8, 2019), 
https://www.ejiltalk.org/provisional-measures-in-ukraine-v-russia-from-illusions-to-
reality-or-a-prejudgment-in-disguise/. 
158. Judgment and Sentences, Int’l Mil. Tribunal at Nuremberg (Oct. 1, 1946), 
as reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L. L. 172, 220-221 (1947). 
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subject to the I.C.J.’s jurisdiction under Article IX. The I.C.J. clarified 
that States owe a duty to prevent genocide: 
[I]n the view of the Court, taking into account the established 
purpose of the Convention, the effect of Article I is to prohibit States 
from themselves committing genocide. Such a prohibition follows, 
first, from the fact that the Article categorizes genocide as ‘‘a crime 
under international law’’: by agreeing to such a categorization, the 
States parties must logically be undertaking not to commit the act so 
described. Secondly, it follows from the expressly stated obligation 
to prevent the commission of acts of genocide. That obligation 
requires the States parties, inter alia, to employ the means at their 
disposal, in circumstances to be described more specifically later in 
this Judgment, to prevent persons or groups not directly under their 
authority from committing an act of genocide or any of the other acts 
mentioned in Article III. It would be paradoxical if States were thus 
under an obligation to prevent, so far as within their power, 
commission of genocide by persons over whom they have a certain 
influence, but were not forbidden to commit such acts through their 
own organs, or persons over whom they have such firm control that 
their conduct is attributable to the State concerned under 
international law. In short, the obligation to prevent genocide 
necessarily implies the prohibition of the commission of genocide.159 
Here, the I.C.J. also concluded that States are under an obligation 
to not commit the crime of genocide.160 If they do not observe this duty, 
they will incur State responsibility. The judgment confirms that ‘‘[I]f 
an organ of the State, or a person or group whose acts are legally 
attributable to the State, commits any of the acts proscribed by Article 
III of the Convention, the international responsibility of that State is 
incurred.’’161 Thus, it seems to be firmly established now that if 
members of state organs are found to have committed a genocidal act, 
it would be possible to hold that Myanmar is legally responsible for 
genocide. 
 
159. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 
42, 113, ¶ 166 (Feb. 26). 
160. Id. at 118, ¶ 179. 
161. Id. 
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B. Rohingya as a Protected Group under the Genocide Convention 
One issue Judge ad hoc Kress lamented was the I.C.J. did not 
sufficiently address the question of whether the Rohingya are a 
protected group within the meaning of Article II of the Genocide 
Convention.162 He explained that his preference was based on the fact 
that the question of the Rohingyas’ protected group status under the 
Genocide Convention escaped closer attention during the 
proceedings.163 As he pointed out, the Court simply stated “the 
Rohingya appear to constitute a protected group within the meaning of 
Article II of the Genocide Convention.”164 There is a strong chance the 
Rohingya group may fulfill the criteria of a “protected group,” thus 
deserving the protection under the Genocide Convention. Many reports 
have established that several of the acts of genocide recognized in the 
Genocide Convention have been committed by the Myanmar military 
targeting the Rohingya people.165 Such acts include killing members of 
a targeted group, causing serious bodily and mental harm, and 
deliberate creation of the conditions of life calculated to bring about the 
destruction of such a protected group in whole or in part, as defined in 
the Genocide Convention.166 The failure of Myanmar’s leaders to offer 
even the most basic recognition of historical wrongs as part of the 
transition to democracy contributed to the carrying out of acts of mass 
atrocity against the Rohingya.167 
To understand this better, the elements of genocide and applicable 
forms of responsibility need to be considered. Genocide determination 
comprises a consideration of three primary elements: (1) enumerated 
 
162. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Declaration of Judge ad hoc Kress, 2020 I.C.J. 




165. Refugees Int’l, Report: A Call to Action on Myanmar’s Genocide Against 




167. Catherine Renshaw, Myanmar’s Genocide and the Legacy of Forgetting, 
48 GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 425, 470 (2019). 
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acts of violence; (2) committed against a protected group; and (3) with 
the intent to destroy this group in whole or in part.168 As stated above, 
the Genocide Convention defines genocide in terms of acts of violence 
against national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups. During the drafting 
of the Genocide Convention, there were efforts by some to include 
cultural or political groups, but these attempts failed due to the desire 
to protect stable groups as opposed to fluid ones.169 The International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda held that “a common criterion in the four 
types of groups protected by the Genocide Convention is that 
membership in such groups would seem to be normally not 
challengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, 
in a continuous and often irremediable manner.”170 The Rohingya may 
be conceptualized as an ethnic group, given their unique cultural 
traditions and dialect, and as a racial group, given subjective 
perceptions among Myanmar society that the Rohingya constitute a 
different “race” than the majority population.171 The Rohingya 
constitute a protected religious group, being a Muslim minority in a 
predominantly Buddhist society.172  In this regard, Myanmar officials 
have justified policies of communal exclusion on the grounds that the 
Rohingya constitute a separate race.173 
The Rohingya have experienced violence that may be deemed a 
genocide. Under the Convention, it identifies five acts that constitute 
the actus reus of genocide: (1) killing members of the group; (2) 
causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group; (3) 
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (4) imposing measures 
intended to prevent birth within the group; and (5) forcibly transferring 
 
168. Beth Van Schaack, On Crimes Against the Rohingya: Determining the 
Commission of Genocide in Myanmar, Legal and Policy Considerations, 17 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 285, 291 (2019), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2019/09/Genocide-Against-the-Rohingya-JICL.pdf. 
169. ANTONIO CASSESSE & PAOLA GAETA, CASSESSE’S INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 119 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed., 2013). 
170. Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 511 
(Sept. 2, 1998), https://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-
4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf. 
171. Id. 
172. Schaack, supra note 168, at 292. 
173. Id. 
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children of the group to another group.174 The inclusion of these various 
acts within the actus reus suggests genocide can occur without the 
extensive mass killings of members of the group and through the 
commission of other forms of acute harm that fall short of 
extermination.175 
C.  The Standard of Evidence and Burden of Proof 
Although the I.C.J. is a court of general jurisdiction, it functions 
more like an appellate court than a trial court—disputed questions of 
fact generally do not take a prominent place.176 Both the I.C.J.’s Statute 
and Rules do not have any specific provision dealing with the standard 
of proof or burden of proof. Thus, the Court has a great degree of 
freedom in these matters. Article 56 of the Statute demands that the 
Court “shall state the reasons on which it is based.” However, any 
detailed exposition of this provision is yet to happen. The I.C.J. seems 
to have a deferential attitude towards the agents of the state presenting 
the cases. However, the materials produced by them can pose problems 
when disputed facts are at issue, and the losing party may fairly or 
unfairly be skeptic of the treatment of evidence presented.177 
Evidentiary issues played a key role in the Bosnia case, and it is 
highly likely those issues would be a major issue in this case too. At the 
outset, it is useful to recall the evidentiary threshold for establishing 
State responsibility may hinge on the gravity of the charge against a 
state. This is evident from the observation of the I.C.J. which states: 
The Court has long recognized that claims against a State involving 
charges of exceptional gravity must be proved by evidence that is 
fully conclusive . . . The Court requires that it be fully convinced that 
allegations made in the proceedings, that the crime of genocide or 
the other acts enumerated in Article III have been committed, have 
 
174. Id. at 293. 
175. Id. 
176. William A. Schabas, Genocide and the International Court of Justice: 
Finally, a Duty to Prevent the Crime of Crimes, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION: 
AN INT’L J. 101, 107 (2007). 
177. J. R. Crook, Current Development: The 2003 Judicial Activity of the 
International Court of Justice, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 309, 309-311 (2004). 
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been clearly established. The same standard applies to the proof of 
attribution for such acts.178 
The above observation is evocative of a typical criminal court’s 
approach to the trial of cases, and not typically followed in a judicial 
body like the I.C.J., which is a civil judicial forum. This led to the 
majority of the Court’s judges to not hold Serbia liable for the crime of 
genocide (with the exception of the massacre of more than 7,000 men 
and boys at Srebrenica in July 1995).179 The I.C.J. may be more readily 
willing to issue provisional measures; however, when it comes to the 
judgment on the merits, the Court may take a rather restrained approach 
in holding a State liable for committing genocide. While dismaying for 
the advocates of those trying to ensure state responsibility for the crime 
of genocide, this approach has been lauded in the academic 
commentary for its propensity to ensure coherence between 
international criminal and civil fora.180 This is because if a relaxed 
approach is taken regarding an evidentiary burden in a civil matter, it is 
possible that a person working in an official capacity may be acquitted 
of genocide in an international court, but at the same time, that person’s 
state may be found liable for genocide in an international civil court.181 
If past jurisprudence is followed, any official document within the 
possession of Myanmar’s authorities desired to be withheld by them, 
could well be allowed on the grounds of state secrecy, as is what 
occurred in Bosnia.182 By invoking its power under Article 49 of the 
I.C.J. Statute, the Court could “call upon the agents to produce any 
document or to supply any explanations. Formal note shall be taken of 
any refusal.”183 However, it abstained from doing so.184 This would 
mean that any documents within the possession of Myanmar law 
enforcement agencies may be withheld from the I.C.J. If that happens, 
 
178. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. at 
129, ¶ 209 (Feb. 2). 
179. Id. at 238, ¶ 471(5). 
180. Schabas, supra note 176, at 108-09. 
181. Id. 
182. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 128, ¶ 205 
(Feb. 2). 
183. Id. at 57, 128, ¶¶ 44, 205. 
184. Id. at 128, ¶ 205. 
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the onus would be on the Gambians to prove their case with other 
materials. In particular, assuming that the Court is satisfied with the 
existence of actus reus, then for proving the mens rea, Myanmar’s non-
disclosure of official materials could make it harder to prove the 
genocidal intent of the authorities of Myanmar.185 However, it may 
somewhat help Gambia that the I.C.J. has this settled jurisprudence that 
the existence of a negative fact may not lie on the applicant.186 
It is promising for Gambia that Vice-President Xue has observed 
“the weight of the said [IIFFMM] reports cannot be ignored.”187 This 
resonates with the finding of the Court in the Bosnia case, that the 
probative value of report of an official body: 
[d]epends, among other things, on (1) the source of the item of 
evidence (for instance partisan, or neutral), (2) the process by which 
it has been generated (for instance an anonymous press report or the 
product of a careful court or court-like process), and (3) the quality 
or character of the item (such as statements against interest, and 
agreed or uncontested facts).188 
Thus, it seems that the IIFFMM report would easily pass the first of the 
three criteria. The third criteria may be inapplicable, as it is not 
necessarily a relevant position to either of the parties for the case at 
hand. 
 
185. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 250 
(Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed., 2009) (observing that, “[t]he existence of a plan or 
policy has also proven decisive when the analysis shifts from individual criminal 
liability to State responsibility. Rather than seriously inquire as to whether a single 
individual, whose acts could be imputed to the State in question, had killed members 
of the group or committed one of the other acts with genocidal intent at the personal 
level a’ la Jelisic´, the analysis has focused on evidence of State policy. For example, 
the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur concluded that ‘the Government 
of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide’ in answering the Security Council’s 
question whether genocide had been committed.”). 
186. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Croat. v. Serb.), 2015 I.C.J. 3, ¶ 174 (Feb. 3). 
187. Gambia v. Myanmar, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Xue, 2020 I.C.J. 
1, 3, ¶ 9 (Jan. 23) https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-
ORD-01-01-EN.pdf (hereinafter Separate Opinion of Vice-President Xue). 
188. Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. at 135, ¶ 227 
(Feb. 2). 
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Furthermore, should the I.C.J. follow its holding in the Congo case, 
Gambia may find it easier to establish the factual elements of its case. 
As in the Congo case, the I.C.J. started with the premise that it “will 
treat with caution evidentiary materials specially prepared for this case 
and also materials emanating from a single source. It will prefer 
contemporaneous evidence from persons with direct knowledge.”189 
There, the I.C.J. applied “credible evidence sufficient to conclude” 
(clearly a less stringent standard than “high level of certainty” as 
applied in the Genocide Case), to hold that Ugandan state forces 
committed killing, torture and inhumane treatment of the civilian 
population, destroyed villages and civilian buildings, did not 
distinguish between civilian and military targets, failed to protect the 
civilian population in fighting with other combatants, and incited ethnic 
conflict.190 Thus, if the Court takes a similar approach, this less 
stringent standard of evidence may make it easier for Gambia to prove 
its case.191 
A potentially interesting twist could be the use of satellite images 
as evidence before the I.C.J. should Gambia decide to do so. This new 
technology could expand the scope of looking back in time and pinpoint 
activities geospatially, which could detect changes which may easily 
escape the naked eye.192 There is a significant advantage in using this 
technology in the investigation and trial of atrocious crimes.193 
Although satellite information may not prove the commission or 
omission of certain events, it may serve as a powerful tool in 
corroborating evidence which is not easily malleable.194 Indeed, there 
 
189. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Provisional Measures, 2000 I.C.J. 30, ¶ 61 (July 1). 
190. Id. ¶ 211. 
191. IIFFMM has followed the “‘reasonable grounds to conclude’ standard of 
proof.” Human Rights Council, supra note 82, at ¶ 19. 
192. Micah Farfour, The Role and Use of Satellite Imagery for Human Rights 
Investigations, in DIGITAL WITNESS: USING OPEN SOURCE INFORMATION FOR HUMAN 
RIGHTS INVESTIGATION, DOCUMENTATION, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Sam Dubberley 
et. al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2019). 
193. Id. at 233. 
194. Id. at 233. 
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is satellite imagery showing Rohingya villages being razed in 2017.195 
In some areas where the Rohingya people used to live, new 
constructions belonging to security force bases, repatriation camps, and 
other unconfirmed structures were visible.196 Since some of the satellite 
images are available free of cost, it will be intriguing to see how the 
I.C.J. would treat their probative value if they are presented. 
D.  Genocide or Ethnic Cleansing or War Crime? 
In Croatia v. Serbia, the I.C.J. observed “[t]he intent to destroy, in 
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such’ 
is the essential characteristic of genocide, which distinguishes it from 
other serious crimes.”197 This may pose particular evidentiary 
challenges for Gambia. The I.C.J. in Bosnia recognized a distinction 
between ethnic cleansing and genocide. 198 It observed ethnic cleansing 
is used in practice, “by reference to a specific region or area, to mean 
‘rendering an area ethnically homogeneous by using force or 
intimidation to remove persons of given groups from the area.’”199 
Ethnic cleansing would clearly fall within the definition of crimes 
against humanity, but would remain beyond the definition of genocide 
and may thus go beyond the jurisdiction of the I.C.J.200 The I.C.J. 
referred to the drafting history of the Genocide Convention and found 
the idea of importing the ethnic cleansing within the definition of 
genocide was raised for discussion but abandoned. It clarified that only 
in very limited cases, an ethnic cleansing may be covered by the 
definition of genocide by holding that:201 
 
195. Rangoon, Burma: Scores of Rohingya Villages Bulldozed, HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH (Feb. 23, 2018, 12:00AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/23/burma-
scores-rohingya-villages-bulldozed. 
196. Farfour, supra note 192, at 242. 
197. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 
122, ¶ 132 (Feb. 26). 
198. Id. ¶ 190 (referring to the Interim Rep. by the Commission of Experts 
Established Pursuant to S. C. Resolution 780 1992, U.N. Doc. S/25374 ¶ 55 (1993)). 
199. Id. 
200. Schabas, supra note 176, at 102. 
201. It can only be a form of genocide within the meaning of the Convention, if 
it corresponds to or falls within one of the categories of acts prohibited by Article II 
of the Convention.  Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
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Neither the intent, as a matter of policy, to render an area “ethnically 
homogeneous”, nor the operations that may be carried out to 
implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the 
intent that characterizes genocide is “to destroy, in whole or in part” 
a particular group, and deportation or displacement of the members 
of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily equivalent to 
destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an automatic 
consequence of the displacement. This is not to say that acts 
described as “ethnic cleansing” may never constitute genocide, if 
they are such as to be characterized as, for example, “deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part”, contrary to Article II, 
paragraph (c), of the Convention, provided such action is carried out 
with the necessary specific intent (dolus specialis), that is to say with 
a view to the destruction of the group, as distinct from its removal 
from the region.202 
Thus, in the I.C.J.’s view, even a design to free a particular region of 
people belonging to a certain group by using force, unless accompanied 
by design to destroy the group, would merely be ethnic cleansing. In 
Bosnia, the I.C.J. referred to the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“I.C.T.Y.”) in 
elaborating the distinction between ethnic cleansing and genocide.203 
A similar approach was maintained in Croatia v. Serbia decided 
eight years after Bosnia. In Croatia, the I.C.J. held the distinction 
 
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 
I.C.J. 122, ¶ 190 (Feb. 26). 
202. Id. 
203. Id. But see Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33, Partial Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, ¶¶ 45–57, (Apr. 19, 2004), 
https://www.icty.org/x/cases/krstic/acjug/en/krs-doshaa040419e.htm (taking a 
different approach to the definition of genocide); Douglas Singleterry, ‘Ethnic 
Cleansing’ and Genocidal Intent: A Failure of Judicial Interpretation?, 5 GENOCIDE 
STUD. & PREVENTION: AN INT’L. J. 1, A4, 39 (2010); Micol Sirkin, Expanding the 
Crime of Genocide to Include Ethnic Cleansing: A Return to Established Principles 
in Light of Contemporary Interpretations, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489 (2010); Claus 
Kreb, The International Court of Justice and the Elements of the Crime of Genocide, 
18 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 4 (2007). 
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between ethnic cleansing and genocide is now firmly “rooted in its 
jurisprudence.”204 It observed: 
. .. what is generally called “ethnic cleansing” does not in itself 
constitute a form of genocide. Genocide presupposes the intent 
physically to destroy, in whole or in part, a human group as such, and 
not merely a desire to expel it from a specific territory. Acts of 
“ethnic cleansing” can indeed be elements in the implementation of 
a genocidal plan, but on condition that there exists an intention 
physically to destroy the targeted group and not merely to secure its 
forced displacement … Secondly, for a pattern of conduct, that is to 
say, a consistent series of acts carried out over a specific period of 
time, to be accepted as evidence of genocidal intent, it would have to 
be such that it could only point to the existence of such intent, that is 
to say, that it can only reasonably be understood as reflecting that 
intent.205 
From the record of oral hearings in this case, it is apparent 
Myanmar argued that the acts in Rakhine may, at the most, amount to 
ethnic cleansing but not genocide.206 Such an argument’s success 
depends on the I.C.J.’s interpretation of the genocidal intent of the acts 
perpetrated on the Rohingya group. However, even the order on the 
provisional measure would imply that at least Judge Xue could likely 
be sympathetic in terms of arguments along this line that although there 
may be ethnic cleansing or some other crimes, there has been no 
genocide.207 Judge Xue denoted her reservations with respect to the 
plausibility of the case under the Genocide Convention.208 According 
to Judge Xue, genocidal intent constitutes a decisive element to 
distinguish a genocidal offense from other most serious international 
 
204. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide, (Croat. v. Serb.) 2015 I.C.J. 10, ¶ 510 (Feb. 3). 
205. Id. (emphasis added). 
206. Application on the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime in Genocide (Gam.v. Myan.), Public Sitting Verbatim Record, 2019 I.C.J. 1, 
36, ¶ 35 (Dec. 10). 
207. Gambia v. Myanmar, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Xue, 2020 I.C.J. 
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crimes.209 She observed “[t]he evidence and documents submitted to 
the Court in the present case, while displaying an appalling situation of 
human rights violations, present a case of a protracted problem of ill-
treatment of ethnic minorities in Myanmar rather than of genocide.”210 
Interestingly, in explaining her finding, Judge Xue refers to the 
Government of Bangladesh’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ professed 
willingness to solve the problem in close cooperation with its Myanmar 
counterparts. 211 Judge Xue contended this cooperation could not imply 
that genocide had taken place.212 However, Judge Xue’s reliance on the 
Bangladeshi position is problematic. The position of states on a matter 
may imply common state practice, which can create customary 
international law.213 Here, Bangladesh’s so-called position relates to a 
factual matter. If Judge Xue’s observation was to be followed to make 
a factual determination based on Bangladesh’s position, that would be 
untenable because it would virtually mean that Bangladesh alone could 
be an arbiter on the facts or create a legal position binding on other 
states.214 The Permanent Court of International Justice and the I.C.J. 
indicated unilateral promise can create international legal 
obligations.215 If Bangladesh’s unilateral position adhered to the legal 
nature of the occurrences or any binding promises, rather than the 
factual matters, its position might be considered differently. 
Another potential argument for Myanmar would be to label its 
actions as potential war crimes, which it already asserted during oral 
hearings.216 Myanmar conceded that during events in the Rakhine State 
its forces might have failed to distinguish between civilian and armed 
 
209. Id. 
210. Id. ¶ 3. 
211. Id. 
212. Id. 
213. Ted L. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of 
the Persistent Objector in International Law, 26 HARV. INT’L. L. J. 457, 458 (1985). 
214. Supra notes 211-212 and the accompanying text. 
215. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v Nor.) 1933 P.C.I.J., (Ser. A/B), 
No. 43 (Apr. 5); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), Interim Measures, 1973 I.C.J. at 99, ¶ 
13 (June 22); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), Interim Measures, 1973 I.C.J. at 135, ¶ 14 
(June 22). 
216. Application of  Convention on  Prevention and Punishment of  Crime of 
Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Public Sitting Verbatim Record, 2019 I.C.J. 1, 18 (Dec. 
11). 
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forces.217  Consequently, it may have disproportionately used force or 
failed to protect private property, and therefore, human rights or 
humanitarian law violations may have occurred, which fell short of 
genocide.218 However, this argument suggests a ploy by Myanmar to 
avoid the I.C.J. maintaining jurisdiction over these claims since its 
jurisdiction is based on the alleged violations of the Geneva 
Convention. It would be interesting to observe how this implicit 
admission of responsibility for the killings or injuries to the Rohingyas 
to avoid the jurisdictional reach of the I.C.J. would succeed. 
E.  The Issue of Rohingya Citizenship and Statelessness 
One important remedy that Gambia has sought is for the I.C.J. to 
order Myanmar to declare full citizenry for the Rohingya population.219 
While citizenship is predominantly a matter of national law,220 the issue 
of citizenship or nationality221 can be relevant in international law as 
well. International rights and obligations that result from the link 
between the state and its citizens or nationals in matters such as 
diplomatic protection or investor right protection, make citizenship a 
significant consideration in international law.222 Consequently, 
international courts and tribunals, now appreciate the connection 




219. Application of Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of 
Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Order, 2020 I.C.J. 1,  ¶ 2 (Jan. 23), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/178/178-20200123-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
220. Advisory Opinion, 1923 P.C.I.J. (Ser. B) No. 4, at 24 (Feb. 7) (conveying 
an early judicial pronouncement of this principle note) (“Thus, in the present state of 
international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in principle 
within this reserved domain.”). 
221. This Article uses the terms citizenship and nationality interchangeably. 
However, there is a general trend of moving from the use of the term nationality to 
denote a formal tie between individuals and the state to using the term citizenship to 
denote a more legalistic, individual-right centric notion. See Peter J. Spiro, A New 
International Law of Citizenship, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 694, 695 (2011). For an account 
of the varied use of the terms, see Kristin Henrard, The Shifting Parameters of 
Nationality, 65 NET. INT’L. L. REV. 269, 271-72 (2018). 
222. Eileen Denza, Nationality and Diplomatic Protection. 65 NETH. INT’L L 
REV. 463, 464 (2018). 
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nationality, particularly dealing with the nationality of natural persons 
in two sectors—diplomatic protection and investor-State 
arbitrations.223 
In Nottebohm, the I.C.J. held that according to international 
practice, nationality is “a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of 
attachment, a genuine connection of existence, interests and sentiments, 
together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties.”224 
Therefore, nationality is a legal bond between a natural person and a 
State which, according to the Court, is based on the “social fact of 
attachment.”225 The term “denaturalization” is used to denote all 
deprivations of nationality by unilateral acts of a state, whether by 
decisions of administrative authorities or by the operation of law.226  
Further, denaturalization may occur as collective or mass 
denaturalization, in which a specified group of individuals are deprived 
of nationality by a State.227 According to these definitions of nationality 
and denaturalization, Myanmar’s Rohingya population’s lack of 
citizenship makes its people stateless. 228 
Some argue that denaturalization, like nationality, is an issue that 
falls exclusively within domestic jurisdictions, and are not subject to 
international law.229 However, it is imperative to note that Article 8(1) 
of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961230 
provides: “[a] Contracting State shall not deprive a person of its 
nationality if such deprivation would render him stateless.” 231 The issue 
 
223. See generally U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, 
INVESTOR–STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND IMPACT ON INVESTMENT RULEMAKING, 
Sales No. E.07.II.D.10 (2007) (discussing the ways in which tribunals use a party’s 
nationality to determine the governing law and its applicability); see also Robert D. 
Sloane, Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal 
Regulation of Nationality, 50 HARV. INT’L L. J. 1 (2009) (discussing the role 
nationality plays in arbitration and human rights). 
224. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 23 (Apr. 6). 
225. Id. 
226. RAINER HOFMANN, DENATURALIZATION AND FORCED EXILE 2 (Oxford 
Pub. Int’l L. 2020). 
227. Id. 
228. See Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 20, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1975). 
231. Id. 
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is Myanmar is not a party to this multilateral treaty.232 Therefore, 
Myanmar could only be bound by this obligation to declare the 
nationality of the Rohingya if the rule reflected jus cogens norms or 
customary international law. There is no authority demonstrating that 
deprivation of nationality constitutes a violation of jus cogens norms.233 
Thus, Article 8(1) is only applicable to Myanmar if it reflects a codified 
customary international law.234 
Other international treaties provide similar rules to encourage 
nationality and equality in citizenship rights. Article 5(1) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination of 1965235 proclaims the right of everyone to enjoy 
human rights and fundamental freedoms without being discriminated 
against based on race, color, or ethnic origin.236 This Convention is 
aimed at eradicating racial discrimination internationally to ensure 
cohesion and harmony in international relations and government.237 
While the Rohingyas would benefit from a government that abides by 
the rules and guidelines to a convention like this, Myanmar is not a 
 
232. Id.; see also United Nations Treaty Collection, ‘Convention on the 
Reduction of Statelessness,’ 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=V-
4&chapter=5 (last visited Aug. 8, 2020). 
233. Citizenship deprivation leading to statelessness is not per se arbitrary and 
contrary to international law and jus cogens norms. See generally Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission - Partial Award: Civilian Claims -  Eritrea’s Claims 15, 16, 23 
and 27-32, 26 R.I.A.A. 195-247 (Dec. 17, 2004); see also Sandra Mantu, ‘Terrorist’ 
citizens and the human right to nationality’, 26 J. CONTEMPORARY EUR. STUD. 1, 30 
(2018). 
234. Supra notes 231 to 233 and the accompanying text. Also note Article 38 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stating that “Nothing . . . precludes a 
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule 
of international law, recognized as such.” 
235. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969). In 
a similar vein, Article 9 of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 1961 
states that a “[c]ontracting State may not deprive any person or group of persons of 
their nationality on racial, ethnic, religious or political grounds.” Convention on the 





Islam and Muquim: The Gambia v. Myanmar at the I.C.J.: Good Samaritans Testing Stat
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Updated_Islam camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021  11:02 AM 
118 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51 
signatory to this treaty.238 Consequently, it is less likely the force of law 
in international treaties can effectively support the claim that Myanmar 
should be ordered to grant the Rohingyas full citizenship rights. 
It is a “little difficult to argue” a right exists not to be subjectively 
“deprived of one’s nationality under current [] customary international 
law.”239 “Therefore, it seems [] the only [unequivocal] limit imposed 
by customary international law on states’ powers to withdraw 
nationality is the one banning measures of denaturalization based solely 
on racial or religious reasons since such acts would infringe the 
customary law rule on non-discrimination on grounds of race or 
religion.”240 Due to many progressive changes in protecting human 
rights within international law, nationality is no longer relevant to the 
individual’s status.241 Under human rights law, the individual is 
addressed and protected as a human being, not as a national of a 
particular state.242 Since the right to nationality cannot be authorized by 
international law, it can be assumed that, under customary international 
law, states are obliged to avoid statelessness.243  It is commonly 
understood that statelessness results from the freedom of states to 
decide on the criteria for acquisition and loss of a citizen’s 
nationality.244 However, the deprivation of nationality, which results 
from statelessness, would only lead to depriving many rights and may 
encourage a mass influx of people to move from one state to another. 
Consequently, there should be a clear incentive among states to prevent 
statelessness since this mass exodus would pose a massive challenge to 
the states.245 Hersch Lauterpacht argued “if States[‘] claim the right to 
be the only link between the individual and international law, then they 
must not be permitted to render that link non-existent.”246 Therefore, 
 
238. Id. 
239. See HOFMANN, supra note 226, at 6. 
240. Id. 
241. OLIVER DÖRR, NATIONALITY, 9 (Oxford Pub. Int’l. L. 2019). 
242. Id. at 2. 
243. Id. at 4. 
244. See id. 
245. Guy Goodwin-Gill, Statelessness is back (not that it ever went away…), 
EJIL:TALK! (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/statelessness-is-back-not-
that-it-ever-went-away/. 
246. Id. at 4. 
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there should be a duty imposed on states not to act in a way that renders 
people stateless in their whims. 
Because states have limited freedom to transform its nationality 
laws, the loss of nationality is prevalent within their domestic 
jurisdiction.247 However, the principle of non-discrimination, set by 
international law, also applies to states’ rules and practices pertaining 
to the loss of nationality.248 International human rights courts and 
tribunals have also equated being stateless to the deprivation of human 
rights.249 Article 15(2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
declared that “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality[] 
can today be considered a rule of customary international law.”250 
It may be pertinent to recall in the Brazilian Loans case that the 
Permanent Court of International Justice observed: 
Once the Court has arrived at the conclusion that it is necessary to 
apply the municipal law of a particular country, there seems no doubt 
that it must seek to apply it as it would be applied in that country. It 
would not be applying the municipal law of a country if it were to 
apply it in a manner different from that in which that law would be 
applied in the country in which it is in force.251 
One could contend that the nationality of the Rohingyas should be 
settled similarly to how it would be settled in a Myanmar domestic 
court. However, it is highly improbable for the I.C.J. to follow the same 
approach used by a Myanmar domestic court. Christian Joppke, a 
leading scholar on citizenship and immigration, suggests that there are 
 
247. Dörr, supra note 241, at 11. 
248. Id. 
249. See, e.g., Case of the Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 130, at 66-67,  ¶¶ 178-179 (Sept. 8, 2005) (“A stateless person, ex definitione, 
does not have recognized juridical personality, because he has not established a 
juridical and political connection with any State; thus nationality is a prerequisite for 
recognition of juridical personality […] The Court considers that the failure to 
recognize juridical personality harms human dignity, because it denies absolutely an 
individual’s condition of being a subject of rights and renders him vulnerable to non-
observance of his rights by the State or other individuals.”). 
250. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 15 
(Dec. 10, 1948). 
251. Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Contracted in France (Fr. V. 
Braz.) Judgment, 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 21, at 124 (July 12). 
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at least three aspects of citizenship: status, rights, and identity.252 
Citizenship as status pertains to formal state membership and its 
access.253 Citizenship as rights pertains to the formal capacities and 
immunities connected with such status.254 Lastly, citizenship as identity 
pertains to the behavioral aspects of a person embedding themselves as 
members of the nation or the normative conceptions of such behavior 
imputed by the state.255 
Many scholars argue that an extended time of habitual residence 
should give rise to access to citizenship and that the rights of states to 
treat people within its borders is not unfettered by international law.256 
Scholars also argue  citizenship law cannot be oblivious to the rights of 
individuals in complete deference to states’ discretion.257 These 
arguments are applicable to the Rohingya group because they resided 
in Myanmar for decades. Previously, the I.C.J. found Nottebohm’s 
“actual connections with Liechtenstein were extremely tenuous. No 
settled abode, no prolonged residence in that country at the time of his 
application for naturalization.”258 In contrast, the Rohingya group has 
strong connections to Myanmar, while Myanmar strengthens their case 
for their right to the citizenship of Myanmar. 
In November 2014, the UNHCR launched the #IBelongCampaign 
to end statelessness by 2024.259 Based on this campaign, the I.C.J.’s 
pronouncement on the duty of states to prevent statelessness, which is 
desirable from a normative standpoint as a judgment proclaiming that 
capriciously stripping people of citizenship is illegal, may somewhat 
help to reduce statelessness.260 In the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, 
the I.C.J. also propounded the rule of the “persistent objector,” which 
declared that states who are a persistent objector to a customary 
international law rule would not be bound by it.  However, if there is 
 
252. Christian Joppke, Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity, 
11 CITIZENSHIP STUD. 37, 38 (2007). 
253. Id. at 38. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. 
256. Spiro, supra note 221, at 717. 
257. See id. 
258. Nottebohm (Liech. v. Guat.), 1955 I.C.J. 4, 25 (Apr. 6). 
259. U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, #IBELONG, 
https://www.unhcr.org/ibelong/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2020). 
260. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 245. 
44
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 51, No. 1 [2020], Art. 4
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol51/iss1/4
Updated_Islam camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/11/2021  11:02 AM 
2020] THE GAMBIA V. MYANMAR AT THE I.C.J.  121 
no unequivocal objection, then the lack of express denouncement 
presumes consent.261 In the Rohingya group’s case, there is no stated 
position that Myanmar objected to the customary international law on 
statelessness. Hence, it would be remiss if the Court refuses to make a 
pronouncement on this critical issue. 
F.  The Payment of Compensation to Victims 
Gambia has asked the I.C.J. to have Myanmar compensate the 
Rohingya victims.262  Traditionally, international law states to pay 
compensation for violations of legal obligations owed to aliens. The 
payment of compensation by a state for breach of duty owed to another 
state is relatively scarce. However, the I.C.J. in the Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros case observed that “it is a well-established rule of 
international law that an injured State is entitled to 
obtain compensation from the State which has committed an 
internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it.”263 Assuming 
in arguendo, the I.C.J. declares the Rohingya are citizens of Myanmar, 
the dilemma that arises in this case is that it would be difficult to hold 
that Myanmar should pay compensation to the Rohingya through a third 
state, Gambia. However, a possible solution to that problem could be 
that compensation could be paid through an international organization 
such as the UNHCR. 
The I.C.J.’s jurisprudence on the compensation for genocide is also 
not very promising. In the Bosnia case, the Court dismissed Bosnia’s 
claim for compensation by observing that “financial compensation is 
not the appropriate form of reparation for the breach of the obligation 
 
261. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), Provisional Measures, 1972 
I.C.J. 12, 131 (Aug. 17). 
262. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Verbatim Record, 2019 I.C.J. 19, 68 (Dec. 19) 
(“Secondly, the displaced Muslim residents of Rakhine have made their return 
conditional on a number of demands including the grant of full citizenship, their 
recognition as a distinct ethnic group, return of land and compensation for past 
injustices.”). 
263. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.) 1997 I.C.J. 7, 81, ¶ 152 
(Sept. 25). 
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to prevent genocide.”264 The I.C.J. arrived at this conclusion because it 
failed to find “a causal nexus between the Respondent’s violation of its 
obligation of prevention and the damage resulting from the genocide at 
Srebrenica.”265 Again, despite finding that “Serbia has violated the 
obligation to prevent genocide, under the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, in respect of the genocide 
that occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995,”266 the Court did not order any 
compensation. However, it is possible the I.C.J.’s finding on this point 
might have been influenced by the Bosnian counsel’s assertion that 
Bosnia’s injury occurred due to Serbia’s conspiracy to commit 
genocide or breach of the obligation to prevent and punish genocide did 
not lend itself to pecuniary appraisal, rather “the most natural mode of 
satisfaction . . .  is  . . .  a formal declaration by this Court that Serbia 
and Montenegro has breached its obligations under  . . .  the 
Convention.”267 Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the I.C.J. will 
follow previous precedent on payment of compensation for genocide in 
this current case. 
G.  The Possibility of Domestic or International Criminal Trial of 
Individuals 
There is already a legal proceeding pending at the I.C.C. against 
Myanmar authorities for crimes against humanity, specifically 
deportation, persecution on grounds of ethnicity and/or religion, and 
other atrocious acts covered by Articles 7(1)(d), (k) and (h) of the Rome 
Statute.268 However, because Myanmar is not a party to the Rome 
Statute, the I.C.C. has limited jurisdiction over the case, and thus, it can 
only try the matters if at least one element of a crime is within the 
 
264. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 
42, 233, ¶ 462 (Feb. 26). 
265. Id. 
266. Id. ¶ 471(5). 
267. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Oral Proceedings, 
Verbatim Record, 2006 I.C.J. 1, 15, ¶¶ 18-20 (Mar. 7), https://www.icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20060307-ORA-01-01-BI.pdf. 
268. For an academic commentary on the case, see Payam Akhavan, The 
Radically Routine Rohingya Case Territorial Jurisdiction and the Crime of 
Deportation under the ICC Statute, 17 J. INT’L. CRIM. J. 325 (2019). 
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jurisdiction of the court, or a part of such a crime, has been committed 
on a party to the Rome Statute. 269  In this case, Bangladesh would meet 
that threshold given that it is both a party to the Rome Statute and many 
Rohingya have taken shelter in Bangladesh.270 A finding by the Court 
that genocide has been committed may in turn allow some states the 
ability to exercise universal criminal jurisdiction on accused individuals 
either upon cases being filed by any Rohingya victim or suo motu.271 
While some scholars take an unfavorable view about the exercise of 
universal criminal jurisdiction by individual states because it could 
create anarchy and hamper international stability,272 scholarly work 
cogently demonstrates this does not bear out in practice.273 Generally, 
trials have only taken place where there has been: (1) some nearly 
universal condemnation of the perpetrators’ actions; (2) the perpetrators 
have been physically present in the jurisdiction of the individual state; 
or (3) the perpetrators have not strongly opposed the trial of its 
nationals.274 While bringing the accused persons to trial would require 
cooperation between states which may not be forthcoming, at a bare 
minimum, this could curtail the freedoms of some perpetrators to roam 
the world freely. An example of this would be the case of Indonesian 
cleric and terrorist, Abu Bakar Al Bashir, who did not take the risk of 
 
269. Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under 
Article 19(3) of the Statute,” ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18, ¶ 72 (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_04203.PDF. 
270. Id.; see also, The State Parties to the Rome Statute, Int’l Crim. Ct., 
https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/asian%20states/Pages/bangladesh.aspx (last 
visited Nov. 18, 2020); Rohingya Emergency, UNHCR USA (July 31, 2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/rohingya-emergency.html. 
271. For a thorough account of the exercise of universal criminal jurisdiction, 
see M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81 (2001). 
272. Jennifer R. Breedon, Why the Combination of Universal Jurisdiction and 
Political Lawfare Will Destroy the Sacred Sovereignty of States, 2 J. GLOB. JUST. & 
PUB. POL’Y 389 (2016); Gene Bykhovsky, An Argument against Assertion of 
Universal Jurisdiction by Individual States, 21 WIS. INT’L L.J. 161 (2003). 
273. Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political 
Branches and the Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. 
INT’L. L. 1 (2011). 
274. Id. at 2, 41, 45. 
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traveling to many states when there was an arrest warrant issued against 
him.275 
VI. A (POTENTIAL) FAVORABLE JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS AND 
PRACTICAL CHANGE FOR ROHINGYA 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ initial response to the I.C.J.’s 
provisional order does not indicate potential compliance with the 
Court’s final judgment if it is adverse.276 The statement relies on 
Myanmar’s government’s “Independent Commission of Inquiry” and 
contends war crimes occurred in Rakhine but no genocide occurred.277 
The statement also claims Myanmar’s government investigated and 
prosecuted the war crimes within its domestic legal system.278 It 
claimed the uncorroborated accusations of human rights actors did not 
present the true situation of Rakhine and corroded Myanmar’s ability 
for engendering sustainable improvement therein.279 Even after the 
I.C.J.’s provisional order, physical attacks on the Rohingya seem to 
have taken place unabated.280 
The I.C.J. does not deliberate on issues of post-adjudicative 
compliance of its judgments, and the principal duty of compliance lies 
with the losing party and the U.N. Security Council.281 Thus, if the 
I.C.J. gave Myanmar an adverse judgment based on the merits of the 
 
275. Ben Otto, Indonesia to Grant Early Release to Radical Islamic Cleric Abu 
Bakar Bashir, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2019),  https://www.wsj.com/articles/indonesia-
to-grant-early-release-to-radical-islamic-cleric-abu-bakar-bashir-11547822941. 
276. See infra, notes, 277-279 and the accompanying text. 




280. Eleanor Albert and Lindsay Maizland, The Rohingya Crisis, Council on 
Foreign Relations (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2020).. 
281. See Article 94 of the U.N. Charter (U.N. Charter art. 94) which states: “(1) 
Each Member of the United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party. (2) If any party to a 
case fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered by 
the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, if it 
deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken to give 
effect to the judgment.” 
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case, a crucial factor in Myanmar’s response to an adverse judgment on 
merit could be the reaction of the government; and the government 
would likely be influenced by the position of its powerful foreign allies, 
particularly China and Russia. While there has been considerable tacit 
support for Myanmar by its key allies, such as China,282 it is unclear 
whether Myanmar will receive the same support if the I.C.J. rules 
against it. However, China’s response to Myanmar’s I.C.J. case filing 
suggests that Myanmar may not receive principled response by its key 
backers.283 
In November of 2019,  the I.C.J. charged Myanmar with 
genocide.284  In January 2020, China’s “President Xi Jinping ended a 
two-day state visit to Myanmar.”285 The two countries exchanged 
memoranda of understanding, letters, and protocols, which covered 
thirty-three agreements and projects of information, “industry, 
agriculture, security, and the resettlement of internally displaced people 
in Myanmar’s war-torn Kachin State.”286 As a top investor and trade 
partner with Myanmar, China continues to offer a safety net despite 
possible sanctions from the U.N. Security Council and western 
states.287 
More curiously, the “two countries historically had a somewhat 
fraught relationship but became allies in 2017, when Myanmar was 
internationally condemned for its treatment of the Rohingya in Rakhine 
State.”288 However, China’s support of Myanmar may arguably be 
attributed to its traditional viewpoint that foreign nations should not 
 
282. See, e.g., U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, Senior Study Group Final Report, 
China’s Role in Myanmar’s Internal Conflicts No. 1, 32 (Sept. 2018), 
https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/ssg-report-chinas-role-in-
myanmars-internal-conflicts.pdf (noting that China has either opposed or watered 
down U.N. resolutions designed to punish or pressurize the Tatmadaw, the Armed 
Forces of Myanmar to desist from its violent oppression of the Rohingya). 
283. See infra, notes, 284-288 and the accompanying text. 
284. China’s Xi ends Myanmar visit with flurry of agreements, AP NEWS (Jan. 




288. Thu Thu Aung & Poppy McPherson, Myanmar, China ink deals to 
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interfere in the sovereign affairs of other countries.289 If China is 
supporting Myanmar merely to support its goal to end foreign 
interference, then it may be even more difficult to discourage its support 
for Myanmar. 
If the I.C.J. finds that Myanmar committed genocide against the 
Rohingya, it would be interesting to see if China and Myanmar’s other 
allies continue to maintain close commercial engagement and 
unequivocal public support for Myanmar’s authorities. However, if the 
other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council take any 
concerted action against Myanmar, it may be morally and strategically 
challenging for China or Russia to veto the resolution because it would 
run counter to the spirit, if not the letters, of the I.C.J.’s judgment.290 It 
is not easy to insulate from the global moral pressure which may 
impinge on their soft power.291 As the U.N. Security Council  
resolutions may be viewed as an embodiment of the States’ political 
will and they  are typically easily vetoed; resolutions created pursuant 
to a judgment of the I.C.J.may be more difficult to veto. Permanent 
members of the United Nations, who exercise veto power, may not 
violate international law.292 Since the veto power is a creature of the 
U.N. Charter, which is a treaty, it must give way to the superior norm, 
i.e., the jus cogens norms of the prohibition of genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity.293 It is also argued that exercise of veto 
without regard to a states’ atrocity crimes contradicts the U.N. Charter’s 
object and purpose and thus, runs counter to Article 24(2).294 The 
argument extends the use of the veto in the face of atrocity crimes to 
violate the foundational treaties relating to these crimes.295 Some states 
 
289. Andrew Garwood-Gowers, China and China and the “Responsibility to 
Protect”: The Implications of the Libyan Intervention, 2 AS. J. INT’L L. 375, 380-81 
(2012). 
290. Wu Chengqui, Sovereignty, Human Rights and Responsibility: Changes in 
China’s Response to International Human Rights Crises, 15 J. C. POL. SCI. 71, 92 
(2010). 
291. Id. 
292. Jennifer Trahan, Questioning Unlimited Veto Use in the Face of Atrocity 
Crimes, 52 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 73 (2020). 
293. Id. at 91-95. 
294. Id. at 95-96. 
295. Id. at 97-99. 
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have questioned the validity of the use of the veto in these situations.296 
However, authoritative pronouncement of an international court settles 
this proposition, such as through an I.C.J. advisory opinion, thus it 
remains a scholarly opinion. 
There is a theory that when parties refer a case to the I.C.J. on the 
basis of a compromissory clause, rather than unilaterally invoking a 
compulsory clause in a treaty, (as seen  in the current case), the 
judgments show a greater propensity of compliance.297 However, this 
theory is not borne out in practice.298 I.C.J. judgments in many cases 
have tended to contain rather broad assertions that allow parties 
significant room to maneuver.299 Parties often act without complying 
with the judgment or act by complying superficially with some parts of 
the judgment, and violating other parts so it may claim to have complied 
with the I.C.J.’s judgment.300 Thus, the prospect of a state’s compliance 
or non-compliance depends on the I.C.J.’s wordings in its final 
judgment because if the operative parts are created broadly, it allows 
the losing state party to claim compliance without really complying.301 
Should the I.C.J. adopt very specific wording, it is quite likely the 
government of Myanmar would find it difficult to bypass the judgment 
or claim to have complied with the judgment by taking simple cosmetic 
measures. Indeed, a state’s open defiance to or complete non-
compliance with the Court’s judgments are extremely rare.302 
 
296. Id. at 96-97. 
297. Shigeru Oda, The Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of 
Justice: a Myth?: A Statistical Analysis of Contentious Cases, 49 INT’L & COMP. L. 
Q. 251, 260-65 (2000). 
298. Aloysius P. Llamzon, Jurisdiction and Compliance in Recent Decisions of 
the International Court of Justice, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L., 815, 845 (2007); Colter 
Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 
1987, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 434, 457 (2004). 
299. Llamzon, supra note 298, 845-846. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 823. 
302. See id. The notable exceptions to this would be Albania in Corfu Channel, 
(U.K. v Alb.) (1949) I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U.K. v. Ice.), 
Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, 1972 I.C.J. 12, 16, ¶ 21 
(Aug. 17); United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (U.S. v. Iran), 
Interim Measures, 1979 I.C.J. 7, 19, ¶ 36 (Dec. 15); U.S. Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Provisional Measures, 1984 I.C.J. 
169, 175, ¶ 14 (May 10); U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against 
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Another worrisome feature for the Rohingya community may be 
the general trend of long waiting periods before the rendering of 
judgment on merits at the I.C.J. In a past case, there was a delay of more 
than a decade between the Court issuing an order dismissing the 
preliminary objections of Serbia and Montenegro303 and the final 
judgment.304 However, the confluence of these various factors, namely 
division within the Bosnian government on continuing with the case at 
the I.C.J., dealing with the counterclaim by Serbia and Montenegro, and 
deciding on the U.N. membership of Serbia and Montenegro during the 
relevant period, had delayed the I.C.J.’s final judgment in that case.305 
Thus, it seems unlikely that this case would proceed to fruition at a 
similar snail’s pace.306 
VII. REPATRIATION OF ROHINGYA 
Apart from reparations, a pressing concern for the Rohingya group 
could be repatriation to their home.307 Repatriation from camps in 
Bangladesh is critical to the Rohingya group’s future. An order for 
repatriation will likely issue only from the I.C.J., if it decides the 
Rohingya are citizens of Myanmar. Should the I.C.J. hold depriving 
Rohingya of their citizenship violates Myanmar’s international legal 
 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Jurisdiction and Admissibility 1984 I.C.J. 392 (Nov. 26,); 
U.S. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 
Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). 
303. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugoslavia (Serb. & Montenegro), Preliminary 
Objections, 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11). 
304. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 42 
(Feb. 26). 
305. Schabas, supra note 176, at 104-105. 
306. However, it should be noted that due to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, 
the I.C.J. has extended the deadline for submission of the memorial to October 23, 
2020 and the counter-memorial by Myanmar to July 21, 2021. See Application of the 
Convention of the Prevention of the Crime of Genocide (Gam. v. Myan.), Extension 
of Time-Limits Order, 2020 I.C.J. 1 (May 18), https://www.icj-
cij.org/public/files/case-related/178/178-20200518-ORD-01-00-EN.pdf. 
307. Nasir Uddin, Ongoing Rohingya repatriation efforts are doomed to failure, 
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obligation, it could order the Rohingyas repatriation to Myanmar. 
According to Article 36(1) of the International Law Commission’s 
Articles on State Responsibility308 and the famous formula of Chorzow 
Factory,309 restitution is the preferred remedy to a wrongful act rather 
than reparation. The IIFFMM also states that if the I.C.J. orders 
reparations it “should include restitution, compensation[,] and 
satisfaction with the purpose of reversing, to the extent possible, the 
consequences of the State’s unlawful acts and re-establishing the 
situation that would likely have existed if the acts had not been 
committed.”310 While repatriation is not explicitly enumerated, 
normalizing the situation requires repatriation of the Rohingya. 
However, actual orders of restitution, let alone reparation from the 
I.C.J., are rare in practice.311 
A concern in the current case is, even if Myanmar violated rights 
owed under the Genocide Convention, the material damage was to the 
Rohingya group and not to Gambia.312 In the International Tribunal of 
the Law of the Sea, it held the mere declaration of illegality constituted 
sufficient remedy for the loss of a ship.313 Although the cases are 
distinguishable, Bangladesh—a direct victim of the massive exodus of 
Rohingya from the Rakhine—could arguably have a more pressing 
claim for seeking the repatriation of the Rohingya than Gambia. The 
I.C.J. ought to consider the rights of the Rohingya and not solely 
concentrate on the rights of Gambia, in line with the increased focus of 
international law in the post-World War II period on the rights of 
individuals.314 
 
308. G.A. Res. 56/83, Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts art. 36(1), U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001). “The State responsible for 
an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate for the damage 
caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution.” Id. 
309. Factory at Chorzow (Germ. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 
9 (July 26).   
310. UN Human Rights Council, supra note 82, ¶ 108. 
311. Christine Gray, Selected Legal and Procedural Issues of International 
Adjudication, Ch.40 Remedies, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION, (Cesare R. Romano et. al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press, 2013). 
312. Supra note 3 and the accompanying text. 
313. M/V Saiga (No. 2) Case (St. Vincent v. Guinea), Judgment of July 1, 1999,  
ITLOS Rep. 10, 67, ¶ 176. 
314. See M. W. Janis, Individuals as Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 61 (1984). 
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Finally, there must be independent, international monitoring of the 
post-repatriation period to give the Rohingya confidence they will not 
suffer future persecution upon repatriation.315 If the Rohingya’s 
repatriation and rehabilitation within the Rakhine is not overseen by 
independent international observers, their confidence may not be 
restored for the repatriation to be meaningful.316 
CONCLUSION 
There have been many trials for genocide since the Second World 
War, and most of them have been against individuals for their personal 
involvement in specific crimes of genocide.317 Invocation of state 
culpability for genocide is a much rarer and more profound issue.318 
Whatever the I.C.J. decides, Gambia’s case is remarkable for several 
reasons. Firstly, it serves as a reminder to regimes perpetrating grave 
offenses against international law that, despite perhaps a lack of 
domestic pressure or the existence of powerful allies in the international 
community willing to give their tacit approval to illegal conduct, the 
pursuit for justice may come from unexpected quarters. If we want to 
give substance to the “never again” mantra, it is necessary for justice to 
be served in this case. If the I.C.J. holds Myanmar committed genocide 
against the Rohingya and orders redress for the horrors perpetrated 
against the Rohingya, then persistent pressure from the international 
community can push Myanmar’s government to comply with the 
I.C.J.’s judgment. 
Should the I.C.J. take a more conservative approach, the hopes of 
not only the Rohingya would be dashed, but the hopes of all who seek 
to establish state responsibility for grave crimes. While the I.C.C. and 
the judiciary of national legal systems can play a critical role in bringing 
offending  individuals to justice,  only the I.C.J. can ensure States face 
legal responsibility.319 When a state government perpetrates genocide 
 
315. Uddin, supra note 307. 
316. Id. 
317. See Langer, supra note 271 (noting the trial in national jurisdictions). 
318. See supra notes 77-78 and the accompanying text. 
319. This is because a state would have no jurisdiction to try to another state for 
genocide. See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germ. v Italy; Greece 
intervening) Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99 (Feb. 9). The ICC also only has jurisdiction 
over individuals, not states. See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 
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on a group of its own people, if the Good Samaritan’s bid to seek justice 
fails on any technicality, the potential to adjudicate “the crime of 
crimes” through judicial process will be next to impossible since states 
alone have locus standi before the I.C.J. Even if its judgments fail to 
yield practical changes to ameliorate the situation, a finding from the 
World’s Court that Myanmar perpetrated a genocide on the Rohingya 
people may offer at least some recognition of their suffering, if not just 
remedy for the massacre perpetrated against them. 
 
 
art. 1, July 17, 1988, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, stating “[a]n International Criminal Court 
[“the Court”] is hereby established. It [. . .] shall have the power to exercise its 
jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern, as 
referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to national criminal 
jurisdictions.” [Emphasis added]. 
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